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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Sean P. Severe
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2011
Title: Monetary Policy Issues Arising From Bank Competition
Approved:
Dr. Mark Thoma, Co-chair
Dr. Wesley Wilson, Co-chair
The banking sector has been extensively analyzed in economics. On the
microeconomic side, research has advanced our understanding of banks and
the inverse relationship between market power and bank production. The
macroeconomic side of research has focused on the transmission of monetary policy,
and it is understood that the financial system, including banks, plays an integral role
in transmitting monetary policy decisions to economic variables such as investment,
consumption, and GDP. There is limited understanding, however, about how market
power and bank concentration affects the transmission of monetary policy. The main
iv
focus of this dissertation is to address this gap in the literature and is achieved by
three contributions. First, I develop a theory of banking behavior that accounts
for competition and monetary policy. I empirically test the theory and show that
banking concentration dampens the impact of monetary policy on lending activity
in the short-run. My second contribution involves building a theoretical model with
these short-run lending effects incorporated into an endogenous growth model that
allows agents, banks, and the central bank to interact. This model shows how short-
run lending is tied to growth. Again, monetary policy is less effective in markets
with higher concentration. The last contribution is made by empirically testing the
second contribution. The empirical findings are consistent with both the first and
second contributions; banking markets with less competition adversely affect growth
and also diminish the long-run impact of monetary policy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is well understood that the financial system and banks specifically, play
a fundamental role in macroeconomics. Any principles of economics class teaches
that, even in its simplest form, the financial system is important in equating savings
and investment by channeling funds from savers to borrowers. The financial system
extends and expands credit to the benefit of the entire economy; banks play the
largest role.
The recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 has brought the financial system to
the forefront of macroeconomics, not only among macroeconomists but in the
mainstream media as well. It has brought unprecedented interest in the financial
system, both during and after the crisis. Issues have arisen such as regulation, firm
size, competition, and differing banking systems that must be dealt with in the near
future. The financial crisis has consequent spillover effects on the whole economy
that affect everyone now and for years to come. How and why banks interact with
each other and the economy is important in understanding not only business cycles,
but the long-run health and stability of the overall economy. The micro-structure of
banking is essential in answering these questions.
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The chapters that follow are an attempt to help fill in the gap between
microeconomic (most specifically industrial organization) research done on banking
and the research conducted by macroeconomists. Chapter II takes a closer look
at how banks make lending decisions in the short-run, or on a period-by-period
basis. The chapter begins by building a model in which banks compete in Cournot
competition. After solving a bank’s profit maximization problem for loans and
aggregating to the market level, I show markets with higher banking concentration
dampen the effectiveness of monetary policy on lending activity. Then, using U.S.
county-level loan data, the theory is tested empirically. The results suggest that
monetary policy is indeed dampened in markets with higher banking concentration,
or a loosening of monetary policy (lowering of short-term interest rates) does increase
lending activity in a market with a high concentration level, but not to the extent
that a low concentration market does.
Chapter III builds an endogenous growth model to examine how profit
maximizing banks and utility maximizing agents select the amount of lending activity
for capital investment in the long-run. Using a simplified version of the banking
sector presented in Chapter II, the long-run growth rate of the economy is calculated
from the capital accumulation equation. This link between lending activity and
capital investment is important. While some models show how bank concentration
influences long-run, or steady-state growth, this chapter’s fundamental contribution
is to analyze how monetary policy flows through banks and how it affects lending
2
activity in the short-run, and ultimately growth of the real economy in the long-run.
It should be thought of how the snap-shot of the economy in the short-run built in
Chapter II plays out in a dynamic economy over the long-run.
This model provides a simple framework to analyze how monetary authorities
interact with economic agents through the banking sector. It theorizes that countries
with lower banking concentration have a two-fold positive effect on steady-state
growth. First, lower banking concentration (more competition) increases lending and
capital investment, or reduces the dead-weight loss associated with monopoly power.
Consistently higher (and cheaper) investment in capital generates higher growth
rates. Second, lower banking concentration allows monetary policy to play a larger
role in the long-run. When there is an expansionary monetary policy change, lending
activity increases more in markets with lower bank concentration. Consistently
higher lending for investment leads to higher growth rates in the long-run.
Lastly, Chapter IV empirically tests the long-run theory developed in
Chapter III. Using cross-country, industry level data, the estimates support the
theory that banking concentration creates a lasting effect on steady-state growth
rates. Overall, I find that high interest rates and high banking concentration
lowers steady-state growth. However, a lowering of interest rates positively affects
growth more in countries with lower concentration levels. Higher bank concentration
hinders central bankers’ abilities to adjust lending and investment activity in markets
with higher concentration. This effect also persists into the long-run where the
3
higher lending activity created by central banks occurs more in markets with lower
concentration, and ultimately growth is affected more in these economies as well.
The following chapters show that the micro-structure of financial markets does
theoretically affect monetary policy; the data confirm these results. In these chapters,
banks maximize profits and there are no transaction costs, but the inefficiency of
market power is enough to cause central banks to have less potency on the economy
when setting short-term interest rates. These inefficiencies are dynamic in nature,
which cause lower potency to persist and affect long-run growth rates.
4
CHAPTER II
MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND BANKING CONCENTRATION
2.1. Introduction
The financial system extends and expands credit to the benefit of the entire
economy; banks play the largest role. Beyond equating savings and investment, the
microstructure of banks and banking markets causes heterogeneity among banks and
the markets in which they operate. Since the financial system is widely viewed as
the intermediary through which monetary policy flows to affect the macroeconomy,
it is only natural to think that heterogeneous banking markets create heterogeneity
in the transmission of monetary policy. In this chapter, I construct a model of
a profit-maximizing bank and examine the results of market concentration on the
effectiveness of monetary policy. I show that a market with few banking competitors
dampens loan adjustment induced by a change in monetary policy. I empirically
test this theory using Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) U.S. county-level data.
The data provide strong support of the theory; monetary policy’s effect on lending
is dampened in markets with higher banking concentration.
It is well established that the presence of market power allows firms to mark up
prices by restricting quantities, resulting in a socially inefficient outcome. The same
5
logic can be applied to banks that have market power. They may restrict the amount
of loans to increase the price on loans, and firms who rely on bank loans for financing
can find it more difficult raise funds for investment projects. Investment projects
that would have been profitable had they been undertaken may not get access to
proper funding. If interest rates on loans are marked up above the marginal product
of capital when market power is present, banks may optimally react differently to
monetary policy changes than banks that compete in perfectly competitive markets.
The degree of competition in the banking industry can alter how banks naturally
adjust loans when there are changes in short-term interest rates, and this effect may
eliminate investment projects that might have been funded in a different market.
Monetary policy differences due to banking concentration have important
impacts, both on loan-dependent borrowers and on a monetary authority’s ability to
stabilize the real economy. More concentrated markets may not increase lending as
much as competitive markets when there is an expansionary monetary policy change.
Firms who rely on bank loans to finance investment projects may not have access
to adequate funding from banks due to banking concentration. This is an inefficient
outcome in investment projects because some socially valuable projects cannot be
undertaken due to inadequate financing. The impact on monetary authorities is two-
fold. First, short-term interest rates, the primary tool used by central banks to adjust
the economy, may be less effective due to increases in bank concentration. Second,
monetary policy may not transmit equally through the economy. One region may be
6
impacted more than another due to a change in monetary policy. This poses several
challenges in monetary policy since the Federal Reserve only has one national policy
variable and cannot make it differ in separate regions. Thus, regional monetary
policy differences caused by banking concentration are important to more than just
policy makers, but also to individuals and businesses in the economy that rely on
the banking system for financing.
Market power in the banking industry has been well documented and findings
show banks react differently to market conditions due to competition. Cottarelli
and Kourelis (1994) establish that less competitive banking markets are more
sluggish in adjusting to short-term interest rate changes than their more competitive
counterparts. Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) find that increased concentration in the
banking industry across Europe has resulted in less competitive pricing behavior for
loans and demand. This implies that more concentrated markets have the ability to
mark up prices. Indeed, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) discover that markups have
decreased due to regulatory reforms that have removed barriers to entry. This finding
supports previous literature showing that market concentration can give banks a form
of monopoly power. Sellon (2002) notes that banking competition has intensified due
to the removal of barriers to entry and has affected how banks adjust loan rates to
monetary policy. Furthermore, Hart (1982) shows that there is an increasing gap
between a firm’s demand curve and their marginal revenue curve with respect to
market concentration, giving rise to a price markup.
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Berlin and Mester (1997) and Boot (2000) provide evidence that banks can
gain potential market power through a relationship benefit. When a bank enters a
close (e.g. personal) relationship with a firm or individual, that bank gains important
information about the probability of default, or credit-worthiness of that entity. This
results in better information for the bank as compared to others in the area and can
result in a form of market power for the bank. The firm or individual also benefits
from this relationship in that it can have possible uninterrupted and larger access to
funds when needed. These authors also show that relationship benefits can decrease
with the number of competitors. It follows, therefore, that bank concentration is a
good proxy for relationship benefits.
Two credit channels in the transmission of monetary policy have been well
studied. First, the balance sheet channel describes how an increase in short-term
interest rates tend to decrease a firm’s net worth and cause lenders to increase their
risk premium, or interest rates on financing. Thus, firms with less liquid balance
sheets find it harder to undertake investment projects due to a decreased net worth.
The second channel, the bank lending channel, states that firms with the ability to
internally raise capital are less constrained in financing investment projects when
short-term interest rates rise since they are able to shield themselves somewhat from
interest rate changes. Firms that are limited to borrowing through bank loans
8
are, therefore, forced to adjust investment more than firms with access alternative
financing when there is a change in monetary policy.1
This paper combines research on bank behavior from competition and the
transmission of monetary policy. Adams and Amel (2005) were the first to empirically
study how banking concentration influences monetary policy through the bank
lending channel. This paper adds to their research by building a theoretical model
and empirically testing, and supporting the theory. Specifically, the theory shows
that there is a negative relationship between bank lending and short-term interest
rates, but this relationship is increasingly mitigated as market concentration increases
in the banking sector. Empirically, this is easily tested through a coefficient on the
interaction term of monetary policy and bank concentration. The empirical analysis
is quite robust and supports the theory developed in this chapter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops a theoretical
model showing why market concentration can change a bank’s optimal behavior.
Section 2.3 provides the empirical methodology and describes the data. Section 2.4
contains the empirical results and Section 2.5 concludes.
1See Ceccetti (1995) or Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a more detailed explanation of both
credit channels.
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2.2. Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 General Setup
Banks compete in a Cournot setting and maximize profits via the expected net
return on funds taking the choices of other banks as given. Funds can be allocated
to assets but to raise additional funds beyond original equity, banks must pay a
rate of return on liabilities. There are three assets: loans, reserves, and government
securities. There is one liability: deposits. Letting xiL, xiR, and xiG be the proportion
of funds that an individual bank i has in loans, reserves, and securities, respectively,
a bank seeks to maximize the expected rate of return on funds (profits), or
EiF = [Wi +Di]
∑
k
xikEik −DiRi (2.1)
where Wi is original equity of the bank, Eik is the expected rate of return on the k
th
asset, Di are deposits, and Ri is the interest paid on deposits by bank i.
With this general framework, I can describe a bank’s assets and liabilities in
more detail.
2.2.2 Assets and Liabilities
Banks allocate funds over three assets: loans, reserves, and government
securities. All yield a rate of return for the bank. Each market has an exogenous
distribution of relationship benefits on loans. Therefore, each bank in the market has
10
a different relationship benefit measure. Furthermore, each bank faces a downward-
sloping inverse demand curve that is a function of loans and other exogenous bank-
specific and market-specific variables, β, or
ri = f
(∑
j
xjL, β
)
, f ′1(.) < 0
where ri is bank i’s interest rate on loans, xjL is the quantity of loans from bank j,
and
∑
j xjL is the total market funds allocated in loans (e.g. market quantity).
Since banks have different relationship benefits which map into differing
monitoring costs or probabilities of default, the expected rate of return on loans,
EiL, is strictly less than the interest rate on loans. More specifically,
EiL < ri if σiL > 0
and
EiL = h
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)
, where h′1(.) < 0, h
′
3(.) < 0
where σiL is the monitoring costs or probability of default on loans. It is decreasing
in a bank’s relationship benefit stance.
Banks also hold a proportion of funds as reserves, xiR. A bank can loan
its excess reserves into the federal funds market and receive the overnight rate of
interest, the federal funds rate, in return. Letting ER denote the expected rate of
11
return on reserves, then ER is the federal funds rate, or a monetary policy
measure. It is assumed to be exogenously set by the Central Bank.
Lastly, banks hold government securities, xiG. Government securities are
provided with perfectly inelastic supply and unlike loans, do not have a risk of default.
The securities pay the risk-free rate of return, EG, and can be liquidated with relative
ease.
Banks raise funds for assets by securing deposits from consumers, Di. To
attract deposits, banks pay an interest rate on the account; deposits are increasing
in this interest rate. Therefore,
Di = D(Ri), D
′(.) > 0
where Ri is the implicit and explicit interest paid on deposits by bank i.
2
2.2.3 Solution and Optimality Conditions
The details on assets and liabilities from Section 2.2.2 are substituted into the
general framework. Thus the bank’s maximization problem becomes:
2One deposit is assumed without loss of generality. The overall model results do not change if
more than one deposit-type is issued, as is shown in Klein (1971)
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max
xiL,xiR,xiG,Ri
EiF = [Wi+D(Ri)]
[
xiLh
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)
+ xiRER + xiGEG
]
−RiD(Ri)
(2.2)
s.t. xiL + xiR + xiG = 1
The following are the first-order conditions solving the above maximization
problem using a Lagrangian, where Γ is the Lagrange multiplier:
∂L
∂xiL
= [Wi+D(Ri)]
[
h
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)
+ xiLh
′
1
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)]
−Γ = 0 (2.3)
∂L
∂xiR
= [Wi +D(Ri)]ER − Γ = 0 (2.4)
∂L
∂xiG
= [Wi +D(Ri)]EG − Γ = 0 (2.5)
∂L
∂Ri
= D′(Ri)
[
xiLh
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)
+ xiRER + xiGEG
]
− [D′(Ri)Ri +D(Ri)] = 0
(2.6)
∂L
∂Γ
= xiL + xiR + xiG = 1 (2.7)
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where h′1
(∑
j xjL, β, σiL
)
is the derivative of the inverse demand function
with respect to bank i’s loans, xiL.
If follows from equations (3)-(5) that the following must hold:
[
h
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)
+ xiLh
′
1
(∑
j
xjL, β, σiL
)]
= ER = EG (2.8)
or banks optimally choose to lend until the expected marginal revenue of loans is
equal to the opportunity cost of putting that money into other assets: the federal
funds rate or the risk-free return on government securities. Equation (2.8) states
that banks lend until the expected return from loans (on the margin) is equal to the
opportunity cost of loans; either the risk-free rate or the federal funds rate.
2.2.4 Comparative Statics
This section aggregates all of the bank’s first order conditions, equation (2.8),
and shows a bank market loan response to a change in monetary policy (the federal
funds rate) is a function of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Moreover, the higher
the HHI in a market (e.g. less competitive) the less that market responds to a change
in monetary policy.
Defining market quantity as XL, rearranging equation (2.8), multiplying the
right hand side by XL
XL
, and using the fact that xiL
XL
= si or market share for bank i,
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then
h(xiL, β, σiL)− ER = −siXLh′1(xiL, β, σiL)
where
XL ≡
∑
j
xjL
Multiplying both sides by market share and aggregating all banks in the market
shows
h(XL, β, σ¯L)− ER = −HHI ∗XLh′1(XL, β, σ¯L) (2.9)
where σ¯L is the market average default rate, h(.)−ER is the average market markup,
and HHI is the Herfindahl index in the market since HHI =
∑
i s
2
i . Equation (9)
shows the average markup on loans is increasing in the HHI since h′1(XL, β, σ¯L) < 0.
Furthermore, the market loan response to a change in ER, the federal funds
rate is
dXL
dER
=
1
h′1(XL, β, σ¯L) +HHI[h
′
1(XL, β, σ¯L) +XLh
′′
1(XL, β, σ¯L)]
< 0 (2.10)
or the response is decreasing (in absolute value) with the Herfindahl index. Equation
(2.10) is assumed to be strictly negative since Novshek (1985) shows a Cournot
equilibrium is guaranteed so long as
15
h′1(XL, β, σ¯L) +XLh
′′
1(XL, β, σ¯L) ≤ 0
or a bank’s marginal revenue is not increasing in its competitor’s loans.3
Equation (2.10) shows that the higher the market HHI, the less that market
responds to a change in monetary policy. Since monopoly banks restrict lending
to raise the interest rate on loans, they lend a fraction of the loans that would be
achieved in a perfectly competitive market. In essence, when short-term interest rates
change, monopoly banks only adjust lending fractionally to a perfectly competitive
market. As discussed in Hart (1982), higher concentration increases the gap between
a bank’s demand curve, h(.) and it’s marginal revenue curve, xiLh
′(.) + h(.). Since
a monopoly’s marginal revenue curve is steeper than the market demand curve
(creating the gap), monopolies adjust quantities less than perfectly competitive banks
due to an associated cost change (monetary policy). Monetary policy effectiveness
differs across markets because banks in a monopolistic market react less than banks
in a highly competitive market due to differences in marginal revenue curves, not
monetary non-neutralities. These findings support Dixon and Rankin (1994) where
the presence of imperfect competition does not overturn monetary neutrality.
This basic framework sheds light on how market concentration can skew the
transmission of monetary policy. Since a highly competitive market causes loans to
contract more than a non-competitive market due to a change in monetary policy,
3All equations and calculations for this section are available in Appendix A.1.
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there are asymmetric effects on the real economy from changes in the monetary policy
stance. In essence, markets that are highly concentrated dampen monetary policy.
2.3. Empirical Methodology and Data
Section 2.2 provides a fundamental relationship between market lending
volume, monetary policy, and market concentration. Market lending is the
bank “choice” variable while monetary policy and market concentration are given
exogenously. Differences in concentration across markets create differing markets
responses to monetary policy changes. A reduced form equation is assumed that
takes the form
Loansit = α0 + α1FFRt + α2HHIit + α3FFRt ∗HHIit + ΨX ′it + ηit (2.11)
where Loansit is the total lending in market i at time t, FFRt is the federal funds
rate, or monetary policy stance at time t, and HHIit is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index in market i at time t. Xit is a matrix of other explanatory variables. Theory
predicts that α1 < 0, or loans are inversely related to the federal funds rate. From
equation (10), the coefficient on the interaction term, α3, determines if markets
with different concentrations react differently to monetary policy changes. If more
concentrated markets dampen monetary policy, then the interaction term should
mitigate that coefficient, or α3 > 0.
17
It is fundamental to define a banking market before proceeding. The market is
determined by two characteristics; the good and the location. Based on the theory
outlined above, lending volume is the market output. Furthermore, the bank lending
channel suggests a proper market in the context of monetary policy should be lending
to businesses and that small businesses are the ones most affected by monetary policy
actions. Therefore, the market good is defined as total market lending to businesses.
Since the local market is for business lending, the location is characterized
by the banking area in which a (local) business borrows to meet financing needs.
The Federal Reserve defines a banking market as a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), as noted by Laderman (2009). For non-MSA districts, the county serves
as a banking market. This definition is reasonable, as businesses in rural areas are
more likely to seek loans from banks within their county and businesses in urban
areas typically borrow within their city or metropolitan area.4 This definition
also is supported by the benefit-relationships literature where businesses typically
receive a line of credit over years of operation and continually borrow from the
same bank in their market. Lastly, this measure is practical as the Federal Reserve
also examines county-level concentration measures for non-MSA districts (see
Competitive Analysis and Structure Source Instrument for Depository Institutions,
or CASSIDI, at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). This market definition is
4See Laderman (2009) for more detail on this point
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also the one used in Adams and Amel (2005) in their analysis of banking
concentration on the transmission of monetary policy.
The dependent variable is the total amount of non-farm market lending by
banks by year. The data used are Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data which
measure total loans under $1 million to businesses. It spans from 1996 to 2007.
Since CRA data are measured at the county level, the data are simply aggregated
to the market level. The dataset contains loan data by three categories: loans to
businesses ranging from $0 to $100,000, loans from $100,000 to $250,000, and loans
from $250,000 to $1 million. Again the data are aggregated across these categories by
market to achieve to total amount of loans under $1 million to businesses by market.
Lastly, the CRA data also contain the total amount of loans under $1 million to
businesses that earn less than $1 million in revenue a year. These data can be used
for a robustness measure since it is believed small businesses are the most affected
by monetary policy changes via the bank-lending channel.
The monetary policy measure is the federal funds rate; the over-night rate on
bank reserves. It is a national yearly variable that is averaged from monthly data.
The Herfindahl index is calculated using FDIC deposit data from 1996 to 2007. The
FDIC collects data on every bank member in the U.S. once a year. The deposits are
aggregated by banking institution and by market to calculate market share. Then
the HHI in a market is calculated by summing all squared market shares. Figure 1
shows the distribution of HHIs across the U.S. in 2007. Figure 1 shows that there
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FIGURE 1. HHI Across Markets in 2007
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is a wide array of concentrations across the U.S. A fair proportion of markets have
HHIs lower than 1200 (competitive) while some markets are extremely concentrated
with HHIs above 4500. Also, it appears that more populated areas of the U.S. are
less concentrated.
Other control variables include the total number of loans made in a market,
which is totaled using CRA data, total market assets from FDIC data, market
population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) price index. The descriptive statistics for these variables are in
Table 1.5 This table contains the descriptive statistics for all markets, MSA markets,
and non-MSA markets.
A market-by-market augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test supports only 12%
of the markets not having a unit root in the dependent variable. A panel unit-root
test developed by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) also fails to reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root in the dependent variable. To accommodate the possibility of a unit
root, equation (2.11) is also estimated using first differences:
∆ ln(Loans)it = β0+β1∆FFRt+β2∆ ln(HHI)it+β3∆FFRt∗∆ ln(HHI)it+Φ∆X ′it+it
(2.12)
The descriptive statistics for these data are in Table 2; it also divides the
information by all markets, MSA markets, and non-MSA markets.
5All tables are located at the end of each chapter.
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2.4. Empirical Results: Monetary Policy Effectiveness on Lending
The coefficient estimates for equation (2.11) are in Table 3. Column 1 is a
market fixed-effects regression and column 2 is the random-effects model. Columns
3 and 4 are the same but with a time trend. Hausman tests suggest that the fixed-
effects models should be used instead of the random effects. As the theory predicts,
the coefficient on the federal funds rate is negative and significant at the 99% level and
the coefficient on the interaction between the federal funds rate and the Herfindahl
index is positive at the 99% level for all regressions. These specifications also suggest
that more concentrated markets restrict lending (i.e. monopolies restrict output) as
the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is negative and significant at the 99% level in
all columns.
Dickey-Fuller and Levin, Lin, and Chu tests provide evidence of a unit root
in the dependent variable, however. Thus the results in Table 3 might arise from a
spurious regression. Table 4 contains the results for regression estimates of equation
(2.12). Table 4 is identical to Table 3 except for the equations used for estimating.
Again, Hausman tests suggest that fixed-effects models should be used (Columns 1
and 3), but the coefficients of interest are robust across the random-effects models
as well. The results in Table 4 support the theory that more concentrated banking
markets optimally react less to monetary policy, causing changes in monetary policy
to be less effective. The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive and
the opposite sign of monetary policy. Furthermore, the Herfindahl index alone does
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not appear to significantly affect lending by itself, but rather through monetary policy
via the interaction term. The significance and the magnitudes of the coefficients of
interest are quite robust across sensitivity-checks.6
To give a numerical example from column 1, a 100 basis point (1%) increase
in monetary policy can contract loans by 7.22% in a market that did not experience
a banking concentration change, but loans will contract by only 6.31% for the same
monetary policy change in a market that is 10% more concentrated (assuming that
changes in concentration do not affect lending itself). There are asymmetries in
monetary policy transmission created by market concentration in the banking sector.
The results above may be driven by the market definition, however. In other
words MSA districts may react differently than non-MSA districts. To allow for a
possible bias in the results, the market definition needs to be examined more closely.
Table 5, column 1 contains the results when adding in an urban dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if a market has an MSA classification, and 0 if it is in a non-MSA
district (a single county) is added to the model. Columns 2 and 3 present the results
of the same regression results as Table 4, column 1 but between MSA (urban) and
non-MSA (rural) markets. A Chow test across market definition yields an
6It should also be noted that the results do not differ with the inclusion of one or several time
lags of variables of interest or exclusion of asset growth or lagged loan growth. Also the results
are robust using real loan growth (loans divided by the personal consumption expenditure (pce)
index). The results are still nearly unchanged with the inclusion of GDP growth to control for a
national economic variable. These regression tables are in Appendix A.2.
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F-statistic of 98.5, well beyond the 0.1% critical value of 3.13. This suggests
that markets react differently, and that a market-pooled regression is not the ideal
specification.
As is seen in Table 5, the sign on the interaction term is still positive and
significant for both urban and rural markets, but the coefficient is much larger in
magnitude in rural (non-MSA) areas. This suggests that rural markets dampen
the effects of monetary policy more than urban markets for a given change in
concentration. As Adams and Amel (2005) propose, this could be because the HHI in
urban markets tend to lie below the level of “highly concentrated” (1800) as classified
by the Federal Reserve, while most rural markets lie above the 1800 mark. This is
suggestive of the relationship benefits theory since rural markets generally tend to be
more concentrated, and businesses in these markets are more shielded from monetary
policy and, therefore, loan changes.
Previous work suggests that the bank lending channel is strongest with small
businesses because smaller firms cannot find alternative forms of financing as
compared to larger firms. Thankfully, the CRA data contain bank loans under $1
million to businesses with under $1 million in revenue per year. The only difference
between these loan data and the loan data used earlier is that it is only to businesses
with under a $1 million in revenue. Thus total profits are smaller and these businesses
are the ones that should be affected the most if the bank lending channel and balance
sheet channel of monetary policy hold true.
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Table 6 presents the results using loan data to small(er) businesses. Column 1
reports the regression results for all markets. Column 2 displays the results for urban
markets and column 3 for rural markets. Fixed-effects were used for all regressions.
The results do not support the theory that small firms are the most credit constrained
when monetary policy tightens since the coefficient on the monetary policy measure
decreases in magnitude. This counters the bank lending channel theory because
small businesses should be the most affected by monetary policy changes instead
of the least affected. The results might suggest that relationship benefits play an
important role to small businesses since it appears that these businesses are less
credit constrained in concentrated markets during a monetary policy tightening, but
they also may fail get adequate funding when there is a monetary policy easing.
Lastly, it could be the case that there is a large amount of outside-of-market
loans occurring. Up to 10% of loans come from out-of-market banks when markets
are defined as MSAs (Laderman (2009)). A business located near a market line (for
markets defined in this paper), the nearest bank may be across that line, thus located
in a different market. Laderman (2009) suggests a state may be a more appropriate
market measure than an MSA due to out-of-market lending. Table 7 presents the
results for markets defined at the state level, not the MSA level. The results are
strikingly similar to the results earlier; market concentration does not appear to
affect bank lending by itself, but higher concentration dampens monetary policy.
The interaction term is still positive at the 99% significance level. These results
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are suggestive that out-of-(MSA)market loans either do not play a large role to
small businesses, or that businesses applying for out-of-market loans are not treated
differently than in-market businesses.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of monetary policy in local economies in the
presence of market-level banking concentration. Using a model of a bank that
maximizes the expected return on funds (aka profits), it is shown that markets with
lower concentration measures (or higher Herfindahl indices) exhibit dampened effects
of monetary policy via loans to local borrowers. Using Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) data, which measure total bank loans under $1 million to businesses, the
empirical results support the theory in that more concentrated markets can dampen
monetary policy.
These results have important implications for both loan borrowers and the
Federal Reserve. When there is an expansionary monetary policy change, businesses
that rely on loans from banks cannot get funding for investment projects that
would be profitable had they been funded. This result is not the socially optimal
result achieved by a perfectly competitive market and might tighten funding for
businesses that mainly rely on the banking system. The other implication is that
monetary policy is not transmitted equally throughout the economy. Monetary policy
has different effects on the economy through banking concentration while holding
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everything else constant. Thus optimal monetary policy may change in light of these
results.
Further research is needed investigating optimal monetary policy when markets
have different concentrations. Also spatial aspects should be used to account for
possible cross-market correlations. Additional work is also needed to see if the
banking concentration effects are dynamic and persist in the long-run by affecting
growth rates.
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TABLE 1. Data Statistics: 1996-2007
All Markets Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Loans (Thousands of Dollars) 92,827.76 409,455.8 0 13,100,000
FFR (Percentage Points) 4.045 1.705 1.128 6.236
HHI 3,371.544 2,207.865 0 10,000
Number of Loans 2,697.889 14,494.04 0 666496
Assets (Millions of Dollars) 2,950,000 20,600,000 8.808 1,280,000,000
Population (Thousands) 117.69 489.03 .045 11,607.84
PCE (2000=100) 103.81 7.60 93.55 117.66
Number of Markets 2,430
MSA Markets Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Loans (Thousands of Dollars) 512,145.9 926,353 8,584 13,100,000
HHI 1,562.747 758.910 315.237 8,203.699
Number of Loans 14,720.52 34,151.62 120 666,496
Assets (Millions of Dollars) 17,000,000 494,000,000 3,075.919 1,280,000,000
Population (Thousands) 622.75 1,104.59 42.08 11,607.84
Number of Markets 381
Non-MSA Markets Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Loans (Thousands of Dollars) 14,857.92 22,772.97 0 303,670
HHI 3,711.88 2,225.33 0 10,000
Number of Loans 462.350 656.417 0 11,171
Assets (Millions of Dollars) 303,000 768,000 8.808 13,400,000
Population (Thousands) 23.78 23.02 .045 188.36
Number of Markets 2049
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TABLE 2. Data Statistics: 1996-2007
All Markets Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
∆ ln(Loans) 0.089 0.531 -4.559 5.966
∆(FFR) -0.0254 1.318 -2.348 1.864
∆ ln(HHI) -0.0021 0.135 -2.119 1.706
∆(Number of Loans) 415.486 4,056.059 -9,608 318,170
∆ ln(Assets) 0.255 0.757 -9.044 10.144
∆ ln(Population) (100s) 0.195 0.016 -0.335 0.182
∆ ln(PCE) (Inflation Percentage) 2.085 0.601 0.894 2.900
Number of Markets 2,430
MSA Markets Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
∆ ln(Loans) 0.068 0.184 -1.667 1.106
∆ ln(HHI) -0.0004 0.1934 -2.119 1.706
∆(Number of Loans) 2,353.235 10,016.5 -9,608 318,170
∆ ln(Assets) 0.304 0.504 -4.688 6.197
∆ ln(Population) (100s) 1.028 1.259 -27.956 10.014
Number of Markets 381
Non-MSA Markets Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
∆ ln(Loans) 0.093 .573 -4.559 5.966
∆ ln(HHI) -0.0024 0.1213 -1.267 1.623
∆(Number of Loans) 55.172 174.765 -1,578 6,001
∆ ln(Assets) 0.246 0.796 -9.044 10.144
∆ ln(Population) (100s) 0.041 1.567 -33.464 18.232
Number of Markets 2049
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TABLE 3. Regression Results for Equation (2.11) Using All CRA Data
(n=26464, No. of Markets is 2412)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Loanst Loanst Loanst Loanst
Loanst−1 (1000s) 0.589*** 0.838*** 0.588*** 0.838***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
FFRt -3413.89*** -1539.96*** 4145.69*** 1954.09***
(207.6) (229.6) (256.2) (284.9)
HHIt -1.943*** -0.918*** -1.972*** -0.921***
(0.411) (0.237) (0.410) (0.237)
FFRt ∗HHIt 0.529*** 0.218*** 0.529*** 0.219***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055)
Populationt (1000s) 397.2*** 72.39*** 399.3*** 72.42***
(12.5)* (1.41) (12.5) (1.41)
Pricest (1000s) -19.12*** -25.37*** 129.3*** 58.79*
(2.76) (3.09) (30.6) (34.4)
Number of Loanst 8.01*** 5.75*** 8.02*** 5.75***
(0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.053)
Assetst (Billions) -0.0009*** -0.001*** -0.0009*** -0.001***
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Y eart - - -3537.3*** -2005.3**
- - (726.6) (816.7)
Constant (1000s) 9.178** 32.33*** 6938*** 3960**
(3.65) (3.50) (1423) (1600)
Fixed Effects? Yes No Yes No
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 4. Regression Results for Equation (2.12) Using All CRA Data
(n=24029, No. of Markets is 2409)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1 -0.328*** -0.298*** -0.329*** -0.300***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆FFRt -0.0722*** -0.0693*** -0.0757*** -0.0728***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ ln(HHI)t 0.0410* 0.0366 0.0444* 0.0394*
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
∆FFRt ∗∆ ln(HHI)t 0.0913*** 0.0970*** 0.0849*** 0.0915***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
∆ ln(Population)t 1.677*** 0.865*** 1.679*** 0.864***
(0.313) (0.203) (0.313) (0.202)
Inflationt -1.836*** -1.953*** 2.339** 2.084**
(0.635) (0.618) (0.930) (0.907)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s) 0.407*** 0.265*** 0.419*** 0.272***
(0.086) (0.070) (0.086) (0.070)
∆ ln(Assets)t 0.0126*** 0.0077* 0.0107** 0.0060
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Y eart - - -0.104*** -0.010***
- - (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.147*** 0.151*** 20.898*** 20.204***
(0.014) (0.014) (3.38) (3.31)
Fixed Effects? Yes No Yes No
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 5. Regression Results Between MSA and Non-MSA Markets
Pooled Markets MSAs Non-MSAs
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1 -0.298*** -0.257*** -0.319***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
∆FFRt -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.065***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ ln(HHI)t 0.039* -0.012 0.037
(0.023) (0.015) (0.030)
∆FFRt ∗∆ ln(HHI)t 0.093*** 0.049*** 0.094***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.021)
∆ ln(Population)t 1.161*** 0.165 1.414***
(0.208) (0.355) (0.346)
Inflationt -1.884*** 3.262*** -3.624***
(0.617) (0.544) (0.730)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s) 0.351*** 0.249*** 68.128***
(0.072) (0.030) (2.20)
∆ ln(Assets)t 0.008** -0.007 0.018***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
UrbanDummy -0.052*** - -
(0.009)
Constant 0.0156*** 0.007 0.152***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 24029 3810 20219
Number of Markets 2409 381 2028
Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 6. Regression Results for Loans to Small Businesses
All Markets MSAs Non-MSAs
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1 -0.322*** -0.260*** -0.304***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
∆FFRt -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ ln(HHI)t 0.030 -0.007 0.127***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.036)
∆FFRt ∗∆ ln(HHI)t 0.111*** 0.047*** 0.099***
(0.020) (0.013) (0.025)
∆ ln(Population)t 1.838*** -0.222 1.712***
(0.383) (0.448) (0.407)
Inflationt -9.964*** -5.365*** -11.328***
(0.777) (0.691) (0.856)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s) 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.286***
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.006)
∆ ln(Assets)t 0.006 -0.012 0.009*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Constant 0.311*** 0.179*** 0.292***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
Observations 23981 3810 20171
Number of Markets 2409 381 2028
Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 7. State-Level Regression Results
(n=510, No. of Markets is 51)
Fixed-Effects Random Effects
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1 -0.262*** -0.235***
(0.036) (0.035)
∆FFRt -0.073*** -0.073***
(0.004) (0.004)
∆ ln(HHI)t 0.023 0.021
(0.020) (0.019)
∆FFRt ∗∆ ln(HHI)t 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.015) (0.014)
∆ ln(Population)t 0.537 2.072***
(1.07) (0.486)
Inflationt 5.069*** 5.228***
(0.886) (0.866)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s) 0.049*** 0.045***
(0.008) (0.007)
∆ ln(Assets)t 0.009 0.008
(0.011) (0.010)
Constant -0.040* -0.058***
(0.023) (0.020)
standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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CHAPTER III
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF BANKING CONCENTRATION AND
MONETARY POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS GROWTH
3.1. Introduction
This chapter addresses how financial intermediaries affect economic growth
and how monetary policy is transmitted through these intermediaries. Chapter II
focuses on how profit maximizing banks adjust lending levels in response to monetary
policy changes. While the model shows that concentration affects this lending
adjustment, it assumes a static demand for loans and a static supply of deposits.
This chapter extends that model by taking the same banking sector and building it
into an endogenous growth overlapping generations (OLG) model. The model has
utility maximizing agents that decide how much to save based on a central bank that
targets money growth, and the agents interact and adjust to the banking sector of the
economy. Thus, deposits and lending are no longer static, but dynamic and change
with monetary policy. Essentially, this chapter considers how monetary policy affects
growth, and it shows that countries with higher banking concentration experience
lower steady-state growth rates due to lower capital investment. Furthermore,
permanent monetary policy changes are neither neutral or superneutral as both
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levels and rates are affected. The magnitude of the growth effects depend upon the
bank concentration measure; economies with lower concentration measures, or more
competition, affect growth more than economies with higher bank concentration.
Furthermore, if concentration and inflation are both high, then a small increase in
the inflation target may, in fact, hinder growth. Overall, concentration dampens
monetary policy’s effect on growth.
Financial intermediaries are extremely important for investment projects. They
channel funds from savers to borrowers, which in turn, enables both short-term
and long-term production. Traditionally, financial intermediation was viewed as a
simple bypass that allowed savers to find appropriate borrowers in the most efficient
manner. Recently, however, the role of the financial system in promoting a healthy
economy has been analyzed in greater detail. Specifically, imperfect information,
heterogeneous agents, and financial market power have lead to the financial system
being more of a “role player” in the economy beyond just matching savers and
borrowers. The result of this research has lead to a deeper understanding of how the
financial system affects both short-term production and long-term growth.
Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) build a model with heterogenous agents where one
type of agent always succeeds at investing and the other type always fails. Oligopoly
banks face an adverse selection problem where they do not know what type of agent
is applying for credit and, therefore, banks may screen to identify agent type. Bank
concentration has two opposing effects: it reduces efficiency due to increased dead-
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weight loss, but lower concentration makes screening unprofitable, and there is an
efficiency reduction due to low-type agents receiving loans. Cetorelli and Gambera
(2001) test this hypothesis empirically and do indeed find that monopoly power
reduces growth, though this effect is less apparent in countries that have a higher
percentage of firms that are reliant on the financial system for investment. They
conclude that monopoly power of banks is inefficient and lowers overall growth. But,
banks in countries that have firms reliant on lending have an information efficiency
gain that mitigates the dead-weight loss to some extent.
Tressel (2003) builds a dynamic macroeconomic model with credit market
imperfections to show that financial development depends upon the initial
distribution of aggregate wealth. In his framework, the economy may initially
grow as banks develop, but due high borrowing costs (collateral requirements)
economic growth and bank development stagnate and the economy remains in a
low steady-state. On the other hand, banks may come to dominate the financial
system, collateral requirements decrease, and the economy reaches a high steady-
state. Furthermore Deidda and Fattouh (2005) use an OLG model to show banking
concentration affects growth asymmetrically along the level of economic development.
Banks incur fixed costs and more banks create fixed-cost redundancies. When
a country is in a lower stage of development, the efficiency of more competition
(lower dead-weight loss) overshadows redundant fixed costs and growth is inversely
related to bank concentration. This efficiency effect diminishes, however, during
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development and eventually the efficiency gained by more banks fails to outweigh
the fixed cost redundancies. Growth is then no longer linked to bank concentration
for more developed nations. They support this hypothesis empirically when they
find that higher bank concentration only reduces growth in developing nations and
bank concentration is not significant on hindering or promoting growth for developed
countries.
The role of financial systems in transmitting monetary policy is an important
process we should strive to better understand as well. The transmission mechanism
of monetary policy has been studied, but the methods used to help understand
how financial systems affect growth have not been studied in detail with regards to
monetary policy.
Traditionally, monetary policy is viewed as effective in helping to moderate
business cycles, or stabilizing short-term production, but neutral in promoting long-
term growth. This is usually referred to as the neutrality or long-run neutrality
of money because a permanent change in the level of money does not affect real
variables. Comparatively, money may also be “superneutral,” or a permanent change
in the growth rate of money does not lead to a change in real variables such as
the capital-labor ratio, output levels, and output growth. Bullard and Keating
(1995) site three different classes of models where superneutrality may not hold;
models with overlapping generations frictions, cash-in-advance economies, and Lucas-
Romer endogenous growth models. They use data from 16 postwar economies to test
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superneutrality empirically. They find that their sample of postwar economies exhibit
superneutrality, with the exception of extremely low-inflation countries. These
findings are in support of Gomme (1993), who shows that inflation may hinder output
growth, but this effect tends to be small in economies with moderate inflation.
Superneutrality may be overturned, however, if actions monetary authorities
undertake have persistent implications for the behavior of the financial system.
Azariadis and Smith (1996) construct an OLG model with money growth. By
adding in information asymmetries, they effectively show that permanent changes in
inflation (i.e. changes in money growth) can permanently raise or lower output levels.
When inflation is low, incentive constraints are non-binding and increasing inflation
decreases the slack in the constraints. Agents then, reveal their type and output is
boosted as a result. If inflation is high on the other hand, the incentive constraints are
already binding and increasing inflation leads to higher credit rationing and output
suffers.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 details the sectors of the economic
model, Section 3.3 defines and solves the equilibrium, Section 3.4 shows the perfect
foresight solution, Section 3.5 provides implications of the model with imperfect
foresight, and Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2. The Sectors of the Economy
The economy consists of a unit mass of overlapping individuals who live
for two periods. When young, the agents optimize expected lifetime utility over
consumption, and money holdings. The timing works as follows:
Agents are born at the beginning of period t, and inelastically supply one unit
of labor throughout the period. At the end of time t, nominal wages, Wt, are paid
in money, agents buy the consumption good ct at price pt, hold Mt money, and
deposit Dt into a bank which, in turn, makes loans to final good producing firms for
capital to be used in the next period. When period t + 1 begins, a new cohort of
agents are born and begin working. Old agents gain ownership of banks from the
previous generation and inherit any bank profits Tt from the previous owner. At the
end of period t + 1, the final goods producing firms pay back their loans and bank
owners store any profits for the next generation of owners. Old agents withdraw
their deposits that have since accrued interest, and along with money holdings, buy
the final consumption good ct+1.
3.2.1 The Consumption Sector
Agents have preferences for consumption over both periods and real money
holdings when young. They derive utility from ct and ct+1, which represent this
period’s and next period’s consumption of a member living during time t, and from
Mt/pt = mt, or real money holdings where pt denotes the price of the consumption
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good at time t. Using lower case lettering for real wages, money holdings, deposits,
and bank profits, the agents maximize the following problem:
max
ct,mt,dt,ct+1
U = ln(ct) + ln(mt) + βE ln(ct+1) (3.1)
subject to:1
ct = wt −mt − dt
ct+1 =
id,t+1
Πt+1
dt +
1
Πt+1
mt +
1
Πt+1
τt
where id,t+1 is the interest factor on deposits, τt is real bank profits inherited from
bank ownership, and Πt+1 = 1 + pit+1 is the inflation factor pt+1/pt. Solving this
problem yields the following first-order conditions after some rearrangement:
ct+1 = β
id,t+1
Πt+1
ct = β
id,t+1 − 1
Πt+1
mt
Using the first-order conditions, real money holdings equal
mt =
id,t+1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)
[
wt +
τt
id,t+1
]
(3.2)
1See Appendix B.1. to see the calculations for turning the nominal constraints into the real
constraints seen below.
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while total real deposits into banks can be expressed as2
dt =
β(id,t+1 − 1)− 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)wt −
2id,t+1 − 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)
τt
id,t+1
(3.3)
Since there is a unit measure of households, equation 3.3 gives the volume of bank
deposits, which in this model is the only means for capital investment since banks
take deposits to issue loans to producers.
3.2.2 The Production Sector
The final consumption good is produced with capital and labor, but has a
learning-by-doing externality. The production function for the final consumption
good is
Yt = BK
α
t (AtN)
1−α (3.4)
where α < 1, B is a constant technology scalar, and At is a labor-augmenting
technology. The learning-by-doing externality lies in At. Following Romer (1986),
it is assumed to be proportional to the capital stock, or At = Kt/N = kt. This
assumption is based on the idea are knowledge spillovers that cause output to exhibit
constant return to scale in capital on the aggregate. Essentially, the more capital
laborers have at their disposal, the more they learn and share about capital usage,
causing At to increase. This technology is taken as given when making decisions
2See Appendix B.1. for derivation of this equation
42
individually since individuals are unaware of the spillovers when making capital
decisions. Thus, it is only incorporated after making all decisions. Since output has
constant returns to scale on the aggregate capital per worker, At is an endogenous
accumulation of knowledge and gives rise to endogenous growth in equilibrium;
capital does not reach a steady-state, but rather a steady-state growth rate.
Additionally factors are paid according to the value of their marginal product,
or
iL,t = ΠtαBA
1−α
t k
α−1
t (3.5)
Wt = ptB(1− α)A1−αt kαt (3.6)
where iL,t
3 is the nominal rate of return on capital and the interest paid on loans.
Wt is the nominal wage rate.
3.2.3 The Banking Sector
Banks are Nash in quantity Cournot competitors, that is they maximize profits
taking the decisions of other J − 1 banks in their market as given. J is assumed
to be exogenously given and does not fluctuate with market forces.4 Banks collect
interest on loans and pay interest on deposits collected.
3The interest paid on capital would be pt+1αBA1−αt k
α−1
t but since Lt dollar loans can only
purchase pt+1kt+1 the marginal product of a real dollar in loans today is iL as described above.
4This is consistent with most industrial organization literature as well as who empirically find it
is highly unlikely that bank concentration (number of banks) is endogenously determined. note that
banks are subject to various regulations and controls that influence the number of banks instead of
the usual free entry condition in Cournot models where profits determine J .
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Bank j then solves the following one-period ahead expected profit maximization
problem
max
ljt ,d
j
t
T et+1 = Et{ljt (iL,t+1(Lt))− djt(id,t+1)} (3.7)
s.t
ljt ≤ djt
where iL,t+1(Lt) denotes the expected interest factor on loans which is given in
equation 3.5, and ljt is the dollar amount bank j lends between time t and t + 1.
The interest collected on loans is assumed to be a function of total market lending,
Lt =
∑J
j=1 l
j
t . id,t+1 is the nominal interest factor for deposits between time t and
t+ 1. djt is the dollar amount of deposits collected by bank j at time t.
The solution to problem 3.7 yields the following first-order condition:
Et{i′L,t+1(Lt) + ljt iL,t+1(Lt)} = Et{id,t+1} (3.8)
Equation 3.8 simply states that bank j lends such that the marginal benefit of
lending another dollar equals the marginal cost of that dollar, which is the interest
paid on deposits to collect it.5
5Notice that the marginal return on loans does not equal the interest factor for loans. This is due
to the fact that as a bank increases loans, the interest it can charge falls. Thus the marginal return
on loans is strictly less than the interest rate charged on loans due to a wedge between marginal
return on loans and the market demand curve.
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Now that the individual bank’s profit maximization problem is solved, market
lending is calculated. Since all banks are identical, symmetry can be invoked and
aggregate lending is calculated by summing across all J banks. Because all banks
are identical, individual banks loans are equal to market loans over J , or lt =
Lt
J
.6
Furthermore, all banks collect the same amount of deposits, and aggregate deposits is
equal to individual bank deposits over the number of banks, or dt =
Dt
J
. Substituting
aggregate lending into equation 3.8 and rearranging yields
Et{iL,t+1(Lt)− id,t+1} = Et{H
[−Lti′L,t+1(Lt)]} > 0 (3.9)
Equation 3.9 shows that the markup of loan interest rates over the interest
paid on deposits is decreasing in the number of banks since i′L < 0. When H = 1, a
monopoly markup is obtained. Also, as H → 0 (J → ∞), the interest collected on
loans equals the interest paid on deposits and banks earn zero profits.
3.2.4 The Central Bank
The central bank of the economy supplies nominal money according to the rule:
Mt+1 = σtMt (3.10)
6Here the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is simply equal to J−1. I use H to denote the
HHI but can be thought of as H = J−1. This is mathematically convenient and the results are not
dependent upon this assumption. It is shown in Chapter II that the HHI is not symmetric with
differences in default rates or monitoring costs, but the results and intuition remain the same.
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where σt > 1. In equilibrium, the growth of money determines inflation, or σt = Πt.
Money growth targeting is equivalent to inflation targeting in equilibrium. This
method is also equivalent to interest rate targeting using a Taylor rule for inflation.
Using starred variables to denote targets and η to denote an error term, then a Taylor
rule of it = pit + θ(pit − pi∗t ) + ηt can be solved for inflation, or
pit =
it + θpi
∗
t − ηt
1 + θ
Since pit is linear with respect to it, and it is a linear function of inflation in
equilibrium, inflation can be expressed solely in terms of the inflation target and an
error term.7
In this chapter, two options for σt are investigated further. Under the
benchmark case of perfect foresight in this chapter, σt = σ¯ ∀ t. This is equivalent to
ηt = 0 for all time periods. For the second case, σt = σ¯ + et under uncertainty and
et evolves according to et = ρet−1 + ut where ut is i.i.d. mean zero white noise. This
model is akin to a policy rule described in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) where
interest rates are smoothed and are set imprecisely. In this case, et is a function of
ηt and θ above and is AR(1) because the central bank smoothes interest rates.
7In equilibrium, the interest rate on lending is ΠtαB. Plugging this into the equation for inflation
above, inflation is pit =
αB+θpi∗t−ηt
1+θ−αB . Therefore, without loss of generality, inflation can be written
purely as a function of an inflation target and an error term.
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3.3. The Equilibrium
With the consumption sector, production sector, banking sector, and central
bank, the equilibrium of the economy can now be defined with the following three
equilibrium conditions:
1. Labor Market Equilibrium: The nominal wage rate Wt equates labor supply, 1,
and labor demand, given by the solution in (3.6).
2. Money Market Equilibrium: The demand for money given by equation (3.2) equals
the supply of money set by the central bank divided by the price level pt.
3. Banking Sector Equilibrium: The demand for deposits given the interest paid
on deposits and the supply of loans given the interest rate charged for loans on the
aggregate given by (3.9) equals the supply of deposits and the demand for loans by
producers, or
dt = Lt/pt = Πt+1kt+1
iL,t+1 = Πt+1αB
id,t+1 = Πt+1(αB − Πt+1α(1− α)BH)
With the three equilibrium conditions above, the equilibrium can be expressed
solely in terms of kt, i
e
d,t+1, Π
e
t+1, past variables, and the parameters of the model.
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The economy is in equilibrium when the following equations hold:8
yt = BA
1−α
t k
α
t = Bkt (3.11)
iL,t = ΠtBαA
1−α
t k
α−1
t = ΠtαB (3.12)
wt = B(1− α)A1−αt kαt = (1− α)Bkt (3.13)
id,t = Πt(αB − Πtα(1− α)BH) (3.14)
τt = Πtα(1− α)BHkt (3.15)
mt =
ied,t+1
(2 + β)(ied,t+1 − 1)
[
wt +
Πet+1
ied,t+1
τt
]
(3.16)
dt =
β(ied,t+1 − 1)− 1
(2 + β)(ied,t+1 − 1)
wt +
2ied,t+1 − 1
(2 + β)(ied,t+1 − 1)
Πet+1
ied,t+1
τt (3.17)
ct = wt −mt − dt (3.18)
cet+1 =
ied,t+1
Πet+1
dt +
1
Πet+1
mt +
1
Πet+1
τt (3.19)
3.4. Growth with Perfect Foresight
For the perfect foresight case, I assume the central bank targets a constant rate
of money growth or inflation of σ¯. Doing so gives a benchmark case for temporary or
permanent changes in the money growth or inflation target. Since perfect foresight is
a special case of rational expectations, it is also embedded in the rational expectations
case below where the central bank targets money growth with imprecision.
8See Appendix B.2. for the derivation of the interest rates and bank profits.
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Using the deposit function (3.3) and the terms for wages, profits, and the
interest rate paid on deposits, the growth factor under perfect foresight can be
expressed as:9
Γ =
(1− α)B
σ¯(2 + β)(σ¯R− 1)
[
β(σ¯R− 1)− 1− (2σ¯R− 1)αH
R
]
(3.20)
where R = id,t+1/σ¯ = αB− σ¯α(1−α)BH is the real return on deposits. The growth
factor is bigger than or equal to one given that the constant technology scalar, B is
large enough. Furthermore, the real return on deposits is decreasing in inflation (σ¯)
for a given concentration measure because banks control the real markup of interest
on loans to deposits. But real loans can only purchase σ¯k real capital the next period.
Thus, as inflation increases, capital must decrease for lending to remain unchanged
and interest on deposits in terms of capital decreases.
All else equal, higher market concentration decreases the real return on deposits
which causes total deposits, or the amount available to lend for capital investment
to fall. Due to the learning-by-doing externality, lower capital investment leads to
lower steady state growth. Figure 2 plots how the growth rate varies with bank
concentration. The parameters of the model are α = 1/3, β = 0.98, B = 25, and
σ¯ = 1.02 or a constant money growth of 2%.
9See Appendix B.3. for the derivation of the growth factor
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FIGURE 2. Perfect Foresight Equilibrium Growth with Bank Concentration
Furthermore, permanent monetary policy changes are not neutral or
superneutral in this model. Growth changes if the central bank is (credibly)
committed to changing inflation by altering nominal money growth. Since inflation
acts as a tax on nominal money holdings, an increase in inflation lowers the young’s
willingness to hold money. They instead transfer this difference in money to both
consumption and deposits. As deposits increase, lending and capital investment also
increase as well as growth due to the learning-by-doing externality.
The economy is simulated to test how monetary policy is affected by bank
concentration. If the results from chapter II hold true in an endogenous growth
model, then growth should be more affected from a monetary policy shock in an
economy with a lower Herfindahl index. A simulation of a perfectly competitive
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economy and one with a monopoly bank easily shows how a shock in monetary
policy affects growth. For comparative reasons, the economies both grow at the
same initial rate before the policy shock. The constant technology parameter, B,
must therefore be lowered in the perfectly competitive economy so the initial growth
rates are equivalent. For the simulation, B in the competitive market is 7.3072 while
still 25 for the monopoly economy.
Figure 3 presents the log of capital over time for two economies. The solid
plots the log of capital for a market or country with perfect competition, or H = 0,
and the dashed line shows the same but for a country with a monopoly banking
economy, or H = 1. The dark dots plot the perfectly competitive market and the
circles plot the monopoly market. I also have a thinner line plotting the log of capital
for an economy with no monetary policy change. Figure 3 plots the log of capital
when σ¯ permanently increases from 1.02 to 1.025 at time period 20. As the kinked
line indicates, even a small increase in the inflation or money target by 0.5% changes
capital investment and steady-state growth. If the increase in σ¯ is temporary, growth
would change when the target increased, but revert back to the original rate when
the target returns to its initial value.
Surprisingly, the perfect monopoly economy (HHI equal to one) has a lower
growth rate after the policy change. This occurs because the decreased real return
on deposits from higher inflation decreases deposits more than additional deposits
made from channeling money. These results support the findings from Azariadis and
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FIGURE 3. Permanent Expansionary MP Shock at t=20 for HHI=0 and HHI=1
Smith (1996). They find that moderate inflation increases from low levels increases
growth but can hinder growth when inflation is high. The model built in this chapter
has a similar feature present due to the nominal interest on deposits. For low levels of
concentration and low levels of inflation, an expansionary policy change increases the
nominal return on deposits. However, because the return on deposits is lower than
the return on lending, the increase in the nominal return on deposits is not one-to-one
with inflation. Thus growth increases, but not monotonically with inflation. When
inflation or concentration is high enough, an increase in inflation actually decreases
the nominal return on deposits and growth as well. This can be seen in equation 3.14
where the right-hand side is increasing in inflation for the first part, but is decreasing
in inflation squared due to the minus sign.
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The change in growth due to a change in inflation is summarized by:
> 0 if σ¯H <
αB
α(1− α)B
∂Γ
∂σ¯
= 0 if σ¯H =
αB
α(1− α)B
< 0 if σ¯H >
αB
α(1− α)B
or if the economy is concentrated enough, small increases in inflation decrease the
nominal return on deposits and lowers growth. Also, just as with Azariadis and
Smith (1996), for a given Herfindahl Index, σ¯ might become so high that it actually
decreases the nominal rate of return on deposits and lower growth. Small increases
in inflation are only expansionary for low to moderate levels of concentration and
low to moderate levels of inflation.
The last test for the benchmark perfect foresight case is to examine how growth
is influenced by a change in the money target for economies with relatively small bank
concentration differences. This analysis consists of how an economy with a perfectly
competitive banking system would react to an increase in concentration, but not
enough to make it a monopoly market. To plot this, I assume that there are two
economies with the same initial steady state growth; one with H=0 and one with
H=0.4. As compared to Figure 3, σ¯ increases from 1.02 to 1.03 at time period 20
instead of only 1.025. Technology (B) for the competitive market is 7.3 and the same
parameter for the H=0.4 economy is 10.322. Again, to show how much monetary
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policy changes the evolution of capital, I have included an economy with no policy
change for comparison.
Figure 4 shows that the same intuition from Chapter 2 carries through into
long-run growth as the perfectly competitive banking economy increases capital
accumulation or growth more than the more concentrated economy. Intuitively,
an increase in the inflation or money growth target still increases the “tax” on
nominal money holdings, but since the real rate of return on the other form of
savings (deposits) is lower in more concentrated economies, the optimal decrease in
money holdings is less as compared to the competitive market. Since the real return
on deposits is lower in the monopolistic economy, agents are less inclined to transfer
savings from money to deposits. As the increase in deposits in the monopolistic
economy is only a fraction to the deposit increase in the competitive economy, capital
investment and growth increases fractionally as well.
3.5. Growth with Monetary Policy Uncertainty
Now the consequences of monetary policy uncertainty are examined. The
growth rate between period t and t+ 1 can be written as:
Γt+1 =
(1− α)B
σet+1(2 + β)(σ
e
t+1R
e − 1)
[
β(σet+1R
e − 1)− 1− (2σ
e
t+1R
e − 1)σtαH
σet+1R
e
]
(3.21)
where Re = αB − σet+1α(1− α)BH is the expected real return on deposits.
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FIGURE 4. Permanent Expansionary MP Shock at t=20 for H=0 and H=0.4
The difference between the equation above and the steady-state perfect
foresight growth equation (3.20) is expectations of future inflation. If money growth
is set imprecisely, or σt = σ¯+ut where ut is i.i.d. mean zero white noise, then growth
is only affected by ut in its effects on profit holdings of old bank owners, and will
not affect expected inflation next period. Thus, if ut 6= 0 for one period only, it
only affects growth for one period and growth would continue on as in the perfect
foresight model. Furthermore, since a perfectly competitive banking economy earns
zero profits, growth would be completely unaffected by ut.
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However, if money growth is persistent, such as when:
σt = σ¯ + et
et = ρet−1 + ut
then ut also affects future expected inflation. When there is a positive policy shock
to inflation, it increases expected inflation or changes expected returns on deposits
and money holding decisions into the future. Compared to above, a onetime positive
ut increases deposits and growth increases in the short-run. With persistence, small
changes around a target rate exhibits non-neutrality but maintains superneutrality.
If money growth target changes, money is non-neutral and non-superneutral as shown
in the perfect foresight model.
To examine the effects of persistent monetary policy shocks around a target,
I simulate an economy using a perfectly competitive banking sector and one with
some concentration; H=0.3 as shown in the perfect foresight model. The parameters
are the same as above as well with σ¯ = 1.02 and ρ = 0.5. The economy runs 50
periods with ut = 0 and then 150 periods with ut mean zero and limited to values of
-0.075 to 0.075 to adequately show its effects on growth. Overall u50−200 has a mean
of 0.003 and a standard deviation of 0.0444.
Figure 5 shows the results of the simulation described above. The dark dots
represent the perfectly competitive banking economy, the circles plot the economy
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with HHI=0.4, and the thin solid line is for an economy with ut equal to zero
every time period for comparison. Overall, both economies experience upturns and
downturns at the same time and track the perfect foresight economy over time.
However, the perfectly competitive economy has wider swings than the economy
with some concentration.
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FIGURE 5. Simulation for 200 Periods with Etut+1 = 0
3.6. Conclusion
Chapter II builds a theoretical model of profit maximizing Cournot banks and
shows that monetary policy is less influential on lending in markets with higher
concentration. However, that model assumes an exogenous static demand function
where agents do not interact with banks. The static model presented in that chapter
can be thought of as a short-run view of the economy. This chapter extends the model
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from the previous chapter by taking the same profit maximizing banking sector, but
adding lifetime utility optimizing agents to the model. This model enriches the
earlier model by allowing agents to adjust to bank changes influenced by monetary
policy and can be viewed as a long-run extension of the previous static model. The
overall findings are that monetary policy innovations influence capital accumulation
and growth less in economies with higher concentration. Thus, as with the model
in Chapter II, monetary policy is dampened on short-run lending and these lending
changes transform into dampened capital accumulation and growth in the long-run.
Higher banking concentration, then, impacts an economy in two ways: first, all else
equal, growth is lower overall in these economies, and second, the banking sector
dampens monetary policy changes as monetary policy transmits to the agents of the
economy.
In the perfect foresight model, changes in the policy target rate of money growth
or inflation increase the cost of money holdings, causing agents to transfer savings
from money holdings to bank deposits. The increase in deposits enable more lending
for capital and in the endogenous growth setting, increases the growth rate. However,
the increase in inflation lowers the real rate of return on deposits if the Herfindahl
index, H, is greater than zero, or the economy is not perfectly competitive. This,
in turn, makes deposits less attractive. In extreme cases with higher concentration
measures, the decrease in deposits from a lower rate of return outweigh the increase
from money transfers, or an increase in inflation may actually hinder growth. For
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economies with lower concentration, small concentration increases still see increased
growth from higher inflation targets but to a lesser extent than if concentration were
lower. In the perfect foresight model, changes in the monetary policy target rate do
not exhibit money neutrality nor superneutrality as they affect levels and growth.
Lastly, in the case of uncertainty with persistent policy innovations around a
target rate, the same holds true; higher concentration dampens monetary policy. In
this case, policy shocks affect levels but not long-run growth rates. Economies with
higher concentration measures see levels affected less from the same policy shocks.
The model presented in this chapter highlights that the structure of the financial
system has important implications on both growth and a central bank’s ability to
stabilize the economy.
Further research is needed, however, in a number of areas. First, one could
develop a monetary policy rule akin to a Taylor rule that makes a money growth
target a function of an economic parameter around a target rate. Second, the
OLG model of agents has non-neutrality and non-superneutrality of money even
when not accounting for the banking sector. The model may change slightly if
an infinite horizons money-in-utility agent problem is used. Without a labor/leisure
decision, the infinite horizons model typically exhibits neutrality and superneutrality.
Third, this model could also easily incorporate supply-side shocks in the production
function. One important question not answered in this chapter is whether
concentration dampens, enhances, or has no effect on other changes in the economy
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beyond monetary policy changes. Production shocks could further enhance and
enrich this model into one that has implications for direction and magnitude of
monetary policy changes due to production shocks.
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CHAPTER IV
MONETARY POLICY, BANK CONCENTRATION, AND LONG-RUN
ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. Introduction
The micro-structure of banks affects monetary policy during business cycles,
and the difference in effectiveness may persist and affect the overall health and
stability of the economy in the long-run by influencing growth. While many studies
examine how financial development, specifically banking concentration can induce or
hinder economic development, no one has studied how the transmission of monetary
policy through banks influences economic development. This chapter adds to the
empirical research not only on monetary policy’s effect on long-run growth and how
banking concentration affects growth, but also on how monetary policy becomes
more or less effective due to banking market characteristics.
This chapter empirically tests the theoretical model developed in Chapter III.
I test for monetary policy’s persistent effect on long-run growth with an interaction
term of monetary policy, measured as the money market interest rate, and a bank
concentration ratio. While I find evidence that monetary policy itself affects country-
level industrial growth, the magnitude of this effect depends upon the level of bank
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concentration. Overall, I find that 1% decrease in the monetary policy interest rate
from the sample average increases long-run economic growth by 0.0058% when the
3-bank concentration ratio is equal to the sample average, but the same change
in monetary policy increases long-run growth by 0.0070% if bank concentration is
only 1% lower than the sample average, all else equal. Since the average compounded
growth rate is only 0.67% over the sample period, this effect may be quite substantial
over time due to compounding.
In the short-run, monetary policy is less effective on expanding or contracting
lending activity in markets with higher levels of banking concentration. When there
is an expansionary change in monetary policy (lower interest rates), markets with
lower levels of concentration reap the benefits of higher lending as compared to
their higher concentrated market counterparts. In the endogenous growth setting
in Chapter III, more lending leads to more investment and higher long-run steady-
state growth too. In the short-run, expansionary monetary policy changes increase
lending more in markets or countries with lower levels of banking concentration. The
dynamic effects of a higher lending volume leads to higher long-run growth rates.
The implications of monetary policy’s impact on economic growth due to
banking concentration are robust. Central banks in countries with higher bank
concentration face additional challenges while attempting to stabilize the economy
not only over business cycles but in the long-run as well. Regulators of bank
mergers, acquisitions, failures, and starts also have further difficulties as a merger
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that increases banking concentration may have adverse consequences to the entire
economy. Additionally, the lower growth rates associated with higher bank
concentration affect everyone in the economy, even future generations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 summarizes previous
literature, Section 4.3 describes the empirical framework and summarizes the data,
Section 4.4 contains replication tables and procedures based on previous papers,
Section 4.5 exhibits the empirical results and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Previous Literature
Recent studies investigate how banking concentration influences monetary
policy effectiveness. Specifically, Adams and Amel (2005) find that banking
concentration alone does not affect bank loans, but affects loans through monetary
policy. In essence, markets with higher banking concentration tend to dampen
monetary policy’s effect on bank loans. Thus, if monetary policy eases in the United
States, firms dependent on bank lending for investment have more access to financing
in competitive banking markets when compared to similar firms in more monopolistic
banking markets. A natural extension to the issues raised above is focuses on banking
concentration, monetary policy, and economic growth. Several papers offer some
suggestions as to why banks might affect monetary policy’s flow.
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Pagano (1993) builds banking into a simple AK endogenous growth model.
Banks play the role of equating savings to loans for investment in new capital. He
assumes some portion of savings is “lost” in financial intermediation (i.e. monitoring
costs, transaction costs, etc.). He finds that banks can influence long-run growth in
three ways. First, banks can become more efficient by decreasing the savings lost in
financial intermediation so total investment will be higher. Second, banks can target
loans to the most efficient investment projects, thereby increasing technology, at a
faster rate than if banks did not select the most efficient projects for financing. Last,
banks may have influence over the savings rate through several methods such as risk
sharing, household borrowing, or the interest rate.
Berger and Hannan (1998) show that banks in concentrated markets are less
efficient, as calculated by X-Efficiency. Monopoly banks are less efficient because
they have higher prices and higher costs as well. Therefore, banks do not profit
maximize. Several studies (Berger, 1995; Berger & Hannan, 1989; Berger & Hannan,
1997; Hannan, 1991) empirically support this theory. Each loan costs monopoly
banks more than competitive banks and this inefficiency loss is estimated to be up
to three times larger than the typical dead-weight loss associated with market power.
These inefficiencies can effect long-run growth directly and allow monetary policy to
influence growth by its inefficient flow through these banks.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) test whether industrial sectors more dependent on
external finance grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets. The
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authors find that firms more reliant on the financial system for investment develop
and grow faster in countries that are more financially developed. This paper is a
seminal paper in the field because it shows the financial system and the development
of the financial system can enhance or hinder economic progress. It also led to a line
of papers examining how the financial system, banks specifically, enhance or hinder
growth.
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find two relationships at work when bank
concentration is analyzed in the Rajan and Zingales (1998) framework. First,
higher banking concentration negatively affects growth, but this effect is somewhat
mitigated in industries that are externally dependent on banks for financing. Cetorelli
and Gambera say this can possibly be explained by relationship benefits, where
banks in a concentrated market develop lasting relations with firms and can give
them access to more credit due to better information. Thus, while high banking
concentration negatively impacts growth, it’s not as hindered in countries where
firms use the financial system more often. Claessens and Laeven (2005) also find
that bank concentration boosts growth to more externally dependent firms using
more disaggregated data.
Contrary to Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Deidda and Fattouh (2005) build
an OLG model and show bank concentration affects growth asymmetrically along
the level of economic development. Banks incur fixed costs and more banks create
fixed-cost redundancies. When a country is in a lower stage of development, the
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efficiency of more competition (lower dead-weight loss) overshadows redundant fixed
costs and growth is inversely related to bank concentration. This efficiency effect
diminishes, however, during development and eventually the efficiency created by
more banks does not overtake the fixed costs and growth is no longer linked to bank
concentration. Using the same data as Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), they find that
banking concentration negatively impacts economic growth in low-income countries
only and appears to have no impact in high-income countries.
4.3. Empirical Strategy and Data
To empirically test the theory developed in Chapter III, I use two strategies.
The first strategy employed in this chapter uses data that are averaged over a long
time frame as the dependent variable and uses control variables from the early sample
period as regressors. It involves testing how a control variable from the beginning
of the sample period affects growth over a long time period. This framework is the
one used in several papers, including Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), CG2001 from
here-on-out. The main contribution of this chapter is to add monetary policy and
the interaction of monetary policy and banking concentration into the regressions
used by CG2001. More formally, the estimation equation takes the form of
Growthj,k,1993−2005 = cons+
∑
J βjDj + γ2MPk,1994 + γ3BankConcentrationk
+γ4MPk,1994 ∗BankConcentrationk +
∑
I γiX
i
j,k + j,k (4.1)
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where Growthj,k,1993−2005 is the average compounded growth of value added of
industry j in country k from 1993-2005, Dj is a set of industry dummy variables,
MPk,1994 is the monetary policy stance in 1994, BankConcentraionk is the average
3-bank concentration ratio (CR3) over the sample period, and X
i
j,k is a set of other
control variables. The monetary policy stance, or short-term interest rates in 1994 is
used instead of sample-average interest rates because it captures how interest rates
in 1994 effect growth over the sample period, or how monetary policy today effects
growth in the foreseeable future.
From Chapter III and CG2001, the coefficient γ3 is expected to have a negative
sign as higher bank concentration lowers growth. This occurs because higher
concentrated countries have more dead weight loss in lending and, as a result, these
countries experience less capital growth. Exactly how monetary policy affects growth
is more ambiguous in this framework, but if monetary policy is neutral in the long-
run, then γ2 should be zero as differences in interest rates would not affect growth.
However, the theory developed in the previous chapter suggests lower inflation (or
higher interest rates)deter investment and, therefore, economic growth too. This
suggests that γ2 should be negative. Overall, this coefficient should be non-positive.
Interest rate changes should change growth at least in the short-run, but this effect
should not be as large in countries with higher concentration. Thus, the coefficient
on the interaction term, γ4, is expected to be positive as monetary policy should
have less of an impact in countries with higher concentration.
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Data for economic growth come from the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics Database. It contains
4 digit ISIC codes on value-added for manufacturing sectors by country. Growth
of an industry in a country is the average compounded growth rate of real value-
added from 1993-2005.1 Real value-added is value-added divided by the producer
price index, obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD published
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sample of countries is limited to
OECD members in 2005 due to development differences during the sample period
for countries that joined after 2005. Due to data limitations, the United States,
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand are not included in
the sample and data on the 24 remaining OECD members are used. Lastly, it should
be noted that CG2001 use the same measure of growth from the same dataset, but
from 1980-1990. As a result, ISIC codes in CG2001 are revision 2. In 1990, the
United Nations switched to revision 3 ISIC coding. To compare results to previous
literature, I convert revision 3 data back to revision 2 coding.2
The Bankscope database provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) is used to
calculate bank concentration measures. BvD provides detailed micro-level bank data
that are aggregated by country over total assets to retrieve an asset concentration
ratio for the top 3 banks, CR3. Bank concentration is the average CR3 from
1Some countries do not have data in 1993 so 1994 is used as the starting year. Also 4 countries
do not have data going to 2005. 2004 is then used as the ending year.
2See Appendix C.1. for more information on coding conversions.
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1993-2006. Moreover, for robustness measures, a CR5 and a Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) are also calculated. Several authors have used Bankscope data for
concentration measures, including Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) and CG2001. The
Bankscope data are survey based and, therefore, concentration measures may not be
representative of the banking population. Bhattacharya (2003) examines Bankscope
data in further detail by comparing it to other banking data for India in 1999.
The author shows that the Bankscope data for concentration measures do have an
upward selection bias. But this bias can be fixed or ignored for two reasons. First,
the coverage ratio (sample asset size to total asset size in a country) for Bankscope
is in the 90% range; concentration measures from surveyed banks will not be largely
upward biased since most banks not surveyed tend to be small, rural banks. Second,
the author believes that there is more of a selection bias in emerging economies and
states that the bias will be less apparent in developed nations due to better survey
coverage in these countries. Since the data used in this paper is for OECD nations,
this bias is mitigated to some degree.
The measure of monetary policy can take several forms, but short-term interest
rates are the most common since central banks of the majority of developed nations
target short-term interest rates as the primary mechanism for conducting monetary
policy. For the U.S., the most common measure is the first difference in the federal
funds rate.3 Mihov and Scott (2001) use the money market rate from the IFS CD
3See Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for a more thorough analysis.
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published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It includes short term interest
rates for various countries (i.e. federal funds rate for the U.S., call money rates
for Denmark, and money market rates for Austria). Kuttner (2001) gives evidence
that short-term interest rates are a reliable measure of the monetary policy stance.
Using federal funds market data, he shows that short-term and long-term yields only
respond to ‘surprise’ changes of the target rate, not anticipated changes. If countries’
central banks follow some version of the Taylor rule to target interest rates, changes
in the target to follow a Taylor rule (keep the economy on track and, therefore, not a
change in the monetary policy stance) would be anticipated and not affect short-term
or long-term bond yields.
For example, Canada is an explicit inflation targeter. If inflation is lower than
the target rate, the Bank of Canada would lower target interest rates to keep the
economy on the target path. This change in the target would be anticipated, however,
and not affect interest rates on bonds. Bond rates would only change if Canada
changed it monetary policy stance such as change its inflation target. Therefore,
bond rates should be an adequate measure of monetary policy and will not pick up
variations of target rates that would not be considered a true change in monetary
policy. To keep in line with other research, the money market rate from the IFS CD
is the primary measure of monetary policy, but short-term bond yields, long-term
bond yields and lending rates (such as clearing bank lending rates, prime lending
rates, and advances to households) are used for robustness measures.
70
Other control variables include the log of per capita GDP in 1993, industry
share of value-added, bank development, and stock market capitalization. Bank
development is the ratio of total domestic credit (the sum of lines 32a-32f,
excluding 32e on the IFS CD) to GDP in 1993. Stock market capitalization comes
from Standard and Poor’s Global Stock Market Factbook (1997-2007), which was
previously the World Bank’s Emerging Stock Market Factbook (1991-1996). The
stock market capitalization to GDP ratio in 1993 is used as a control variable. The
data statistics for these data are in Table 8 and Table 10 is the correlation table.
Due to a very high correlation of monetary policy and the interaction of
monetary policy and bank concentration, the estimation of equation (4.1) may not
capture the independent effects of these two important variables. Since these two
coefficients are the central contribution of the paper, another estimation technique
is used that takes the same form as (4.1), but uses panel data. It takes the form of:
Growthj,k,t = cons+ αGrowthj,k,t−1 +
∑
J βjDj +
∑
K βkDk + γ2MPk,t
+γ3BankConsk,t + γ4MPk,t ∗BankConsk,t +
∑
I γiX
i
j,k,t + j,k,t (4.2)
where the data are now in panel form to capture time variation as well. This
estimation allows me to jointly estimate how monetary policy and the interaction
of monetary policy and bank concentration, γ2 and γ4 affect growth. This only
estimates how each variable affects growth for that year, however. To calculate the
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effect of a variable on the long-run (steady state) growth rate, Growth∗j,k, then all
coefficients can be multiplied by (1−α)−1. γ2, γ3, and γ4 all have the same expected
signs as outlined in equation (4.1).
The same data are used for the estimation of equation (4.2) except it is now
in panel form instead of averaged. Since equation (4.2) utilizes yearly data, tests
to ensure the dependent variable is stationary are necessary to avoid estimating
spurious regressions. Using a Fisher panel data unit root test, I find that the null
hypothesis of a unit root is consistently rejected and the data are stationary using
one and two lags (years in this case) and after removing the cross-sectional means.
Thus no differencing of the data is necessary when estimating equation (4.2).
Table 9 contains the summary statistics for the panel data and Table 11 is the
correlation table.
4.4. Replication of Cetorelli and Gambera (2001)
First, I replicate the empirics of CG2001 to make sure my conversion of ISIC
coding of the dependent variable has been done correctly. CG2001 estimate equation
(4.1) above, but without monetary policy or the interaction of monetary policy and
bank concentration. Interestingly, initial results of my replication regressions find
the coefficient on the level of bank concentration to be positive, while CG2001
have a negative coefficient. Since the data are averaged over the sample period,
only industry fixed-effects can be used so I cannot control for country fixed-effects.
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Proceeding, I run the same specification as CG2001, but drop one country from my
dataset at a time with replacement.
Examining the coefficient on bank concentration, I find countries, that
when dropped from the regression, significantly alter the t-statistic on the bank
concentration coefficient. Also, some countries that, when dropped, cause this
coefficient to reverse signs. This technique allows me to collect a sample of countries
that might be skewing the results on the banking coefficient, causing it to be positive.
Closer examination of the countries that significantly lowered the positive t-stat
on banking concentration when dropped (meaning these countries caused banking
concentration to be positive and highly significant) show that four out of six total
were countries that joined the OECD during the sample period; the other two do not
have many observations of the dependent variable. Since these countries significantly
raise the positive t-statistic on the banking concentration coefficient, the six countries
that joined during the sample period need to be controlled for in estimations.
As explained throughout this section, when adding a dummy variable for OECD
countries that joined during the sample period, or dropping them from regressions,
I fully recover the negative and significant coefficient on banking concentration as in
CG2001 even though my data come from a later sample period.
Table 12 contains replication tables for Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) using
newer data and a different selection of countries. Columns 1 has the results from
Table IV of CG2001. The dependent variable is the average compounded growth of
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value added of industry j in country k from 1980 to 1990. Due to limitations of the
Bankscope database, banking concentration numbers are no longer obtainable on a
year-to-year basis from the 1980s and are only available from 1993 onwards. Column
2 shows the estimation results when using the CG2001 dependent variable (average
compounded growth from 1980-1990) but with my newer independent variables. This
effort helps to ensure that my dependent variable was correctly recoded from ISIC
rev3 back to rev2. Column 3 replicates CG2001 using all new data from 1993-2005
on OECD countries that did not join the OECD during the sample period.4
Table 13 contains regression results using data from 1993-2005, but accounts
for different groupings of OECD countries. The first column is the same as column
3 of Table 12. The second column adds in the six countries that joined the OECD
during the sample period: Mexico, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Korea, and
Slovakia in a pooled OLS regression. Significance for all control variables disappears.
The last column adds a dummy variable for the six countries mentioned above and
also includes the interaction of this dummy variable with banking concentration;
all results from the first column reappear. The OECD dummy variable and
its interaction with banking concentration offer insight into why significance is
diminished when unaccounted for in column 2; these countries’ manufacturing sectors
do not act like their counterparts in countries that are seasoned members of the
OECD. First, controlling for country and industry differences, the average growth in
4The regressions also contain a dummy variable for Greece.
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manufacturing is 16.4% lower per year in these six countries. This can partially be
explained by the fact that these six countries were still developing during the sample
period and transitioning from manufacturing economies to service-based economies
after joining the OECD. Also, the interaction term of the OECD dummy with bank
concentration is positive and significant meaning that higher banking concentration
in these six countries boosted the average growth in across manufacturing industries.
It should also be noted that out of the 20 OECD countries used in CG2001, all but
two (Korea and Mexico) were countries that joined the OECD before their dataset
from the 1980s.5
4.5. Empirical Results
4.5.1 Main Results from Estimation of Equations (4.1) and (4.2)
After replicating the results from CG2001, equation (4.1) is estimated in its
entirety by including monetary policy and the interaction of monetary policy and
bank concentration. Table 14 contains the regression results when the money market
rate in 1994 is added (columns 1 and 3), as well as the interaction term of the money
market rate in 1994 and bank concentration (columns 2 and 4). The first two columns
take data of CG2001 (1980-1990) and add in my data on monetary policy. The last
5Interestingly, it should be noted that all significance for all variables drops away in all three
regressions with the exclusion of the dummy variable for Greece, but the results do not change if
Greece is excluded from the regressions. This may be due to unreliable value-added data in Greece
since it was not collected from 1999 and 2003. Because growth is from 1994-2004 I do not need the
missing years to calculate compounded average real growth of value added.
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two columns use my dataset (1993-2005), and only include OECD nations the joined
before the sample period. The first two columns that use CG2001 data with my
monetary policy measure are for comparison for the last two columns.
Column 3 shows that the money market rate does not influence long-run growth
since it is insignificant, but the coefficient is positive like in column 1. However, as
is seen in column 4, significance does appear with the inclusion of the interaction
term of the money market rate with bank concentration. The money market rate is
positive and significant and the interaction term is negative and significant, like in
column 2. The coefficients of monetary policy and the interaction term in column 4
is not surprising because of the high correlation between the two variables (0.998).
This can simply be due to high colinearity of the two terms. Furthermore, an F-test
fails to reject the null hypothesis that both coefficients on monetary policy and the
interaction term are jointly zero; it has a p-value of 0.165 (F(2,435)=1.81). Since
the interaction term is of high importance for this paper, Table 14 is as far as I can
go for data on average compounded growth in value added. The next estimation
technique must now be used; equation (4.2).
Estimation coefficients from equation (4.2) are presented in Table 15. Again,
the data are now yearly data, not averaged across time. All three columns have
industry fixed effects and country fixed effects. The first column includes industry-
by-country fixed effects (essentially the interaction of industry fixed effects with
country fixed effects), the second column has only industry fixed effects and country
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fixed effects, the third column adds a time trend into the regression, and the last
column also adds time fixed effects over column 2. As with the averaged data, the
coefficient on bank concentration is negative; suggesting higher bank concentration
lowers economic growth. Interestingly, the coefficient on the share of manufacturing
is significant after being insignificant in all the previous tables. The coefficient on
monetary policy (aka the money market interest rate) is negative which signifies that
higher interest rates impede growth. This also supports previous empirical work that
monetary policy may not be neutral in the long-run. Lastly, the interaction term
of bank concentration and monetary policy is positive in all four columns, and is
significant in all except when including yearly fixed effects..
Column 2 should be viewed as the base column for estimation of equation
(4.2). An F test supports industry-by-country fixed effects jointly equaling zero
(F(626,4760)=0.899) in column 1. Also the time trend from column 3 is significant
but this is more of a sensitivity check than an actual theoretically supported variable.
Lastly, it is not surprising that adding time fixed effect reduces significance of both
bank concentration and the interaction term since bank concentration is surprisingly
stationary over time. Also, time fixed effects is typically not used in panel data
models. With the test supporting industry-by-country fixed effects jointly equaling
zero, and the coefficients roughly the same sign and magnitude when including a time
trend, column 2, with only industry fixed effects and country fixed effects appears
to be the most appropriate. Lastly, an F-test rejects the null hypothesis for the
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coefficients on monetary policy and the interaction term jointly equaling zero with a
p-value of 0.000 (F(2,5385)=21.33) in column 2 (this was the problem from Table 14).
The coefficients on monetary policy and the interaction term are of the same
sign as Adams and Amel (2005) and Chapter II, which focus on bank loans instead
of value added growth. That work shows that monetary policy becomes less effective
on lending over the business cycle in markets with higher banking concentration.
The signs of their work carry over when analyzing growth of value added for
manufacturing industries instead of focusing on bank loans; changes in lending due to
monetary policy changes carry over to the real economy and also persist in the long-
run. Steady-state growth depends upon the lending level in the economy. If all banks
transmitted monetary policy changes into lending activity equally (independent of
concentration), then the interaction term of monetary policy and bank concentration
would be zero.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the theory proposed above in that
lending levels do influence growth rates, and that due to concentration differences
across countries, monetary policy influences lending levels, and therefore, steady-
state growth rates differently across countries as well. Higher banking concentration,
either by larger banks or less banks, has a two-fold negative effect on growth;
diminishing growth itself and partially canceling monetary policy’s effect on long
run growth via lending levels. Using coefficient estimates from the second column of
Table 15, a 1% reduction (100 basis points) in the money market rate from the sample
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average increases steady state growth of manufacturing value added by 0.0058% if
the bank concentration of the three largest banks is at the country average of 49.7%.
If bank concentration decreases by only 1%, the same change in the money market
rate increases long-run growth now by 0.0070%.6 While this effect may appear
small, it can make a large difference over the long-run with compounding, or if bank
concentration were to change more drastically.
4.5.2 Sensitivity and Robustness Analysis
To ensure that the estimates from the previous tables are accurate, I test for
robustness of the estimates coefficients using several methods. First, I use different
measures of bank concentration, and I also use several different measures of the
monetary policy variable. Next, I include several time lags of the important variables,
notedly bank concentration, monetary policy, and the interaction term. Lastly, I
allow for serial correlation and do several checks for heteroskedasticity.
The results presented in Table 15 may hinge on two variables: bank
concentration and monetary policy. To see how robust these results are, I use
different measures of bank concentration and monetary policy. Table 16 contains the
estimated coefficients of equation (2) across different bank concentration measures.
The first column uses a three-bank concentration ratio. It is identical to the second
column of Table 15. The second column uses a five-bank concentration ratio as the
6See Appendix C.2. for the equations used for these calculations.
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measure of bank concentration, while the last column uses a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) instead. When using a five-bank concentration ratio (CR5) in the
estimation, all signs and significance levels remain the same as when using a CR3.
The point estimates are also nearly identical, but this could be due to the high
correlation between the CR3 and CR5 (0.946).
A better measure for bank concentration suggested by Bhattacharya (2003)
and explained in greater detail in Section 4.3 is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or
sum of all squared market shares. As explained in Bhattacharya (2003), the HHI
tends to decrease the selection bias due to the survey study from BvD. Column
3 of Table 16 presents the estimated coefficients for Equation (4.2) using the HHI
as the bank concentration measure. Surprisingly the HHI is estimated to have no
significant impact on long-run growth, but the coefficients on monetary policy and the
interaction term still maintain their signs and significance from the first two columns.
Table 16 estimates show that monetary policy influences steady-state growth rates
in countries that have lower bank concentration. It also suggests that this finding
does not depend upon the measure of bank concentration used.
Different measures of monetary policy may also change the results from
Table 15. Therefore, the estimated coefficients should be robust across several
measures of monetary policy. Table 17 estimates equation (4.2) but using a
different monetary policy variable. The first column uses short-term interest rates on
government securities, the second column uses long-term government security yields
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while the last column uses lending rates (lending rates from clearing banks, prime
lending rates, average lending rates, etc). Again, the data are from the IFS CD.
Column 1 shows no significance on either monetary policy or the interaction term,
but there is a lack of monetary policy data; only 3547 observations as compared
to 5448 using the money market rate (7 more countries are dropped due to lack of
data). The second and third columns, however, contain more observations on the
monetary policy variable, and subsequently are robust across different interest rates.
The last column uses money market rates minus inflation as the monetary policy
measure. Different monetary policy measures help to support the theory that higher
bank concentration and higher monetary policy interest rates both hinder economic
growth, while higher concentration in the banking sector makes monetary policy tools
less effective. Both Table 16 and Table 17 show that these results remain consistent
while varying measures of banking concentration and monetary policy.
Another way to check the robustness of results found so far is to include one or
several lags of the variables of interest: bank concentration, and the interaction term.
The first column adds one time lag of the three variables mentioned above beyond
equation (4.2). The second column controls for two lags and the third column adds
in a second time lag of growth beyond column 2. Bank concentration is significantly
negative across all lag-structure estimations, but the lags of concentration is positive
and significant. Current monetary policy is significantly negative while the second
lag is positive. The interaction term is positive in the first column and the first lag is
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non-significant. In the second column, only the second lag of the interaction term is
significant, but with a negative sign. The third column has the first lag being positive
and significant while the second lag is significantly negative; the current interaction
is non-significant.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter is important for several reasons. First, while Chapter II finds
monetary policy is less effective on lending levels in markets with higher bank
concentration, Chapter III hypothesizes lending should affect capital investment
and growth. Since this chapter finds the same affects at work on growth as found
on lending in Chapter II, it also helps affirm the theory developed in Chapter III.
Specifically, the empirical results discussed in this chapter helps to support a bank
lending channel for monetary policy, or that monetary policy affects the real economy
via bank lending.
The second contribution this chapter makes is to test how monetary policy
affects growth, and how bank concentration can alter that transmission. The
empirical findings support the theory developed in Chapter III; higher banking
concentration and higher interest rates both impede steady-state growth rates, and
that a lowering of interest rates is more effective on raising growth rates in countries
with lower levels of bank concentration. The overall effect is quite large as a lowering
of interest rates from the sample average suggests to increase steady-state growth
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rates by 0.58% when a 3-bank concentration ratio is equal to the sample average,
while the same change in interest rates increases steady-state growth rates by 0.70%
if bank concentration falls by only 1% below the sample average.
Since this chapter is among the first endeavors to examine how bank
concentration alters monetary policy, there is a wide array of issues that need to be
examined further. Such topics must include theoretical background of the mechanism
that drives monetary policy differences. Further investigation should also delve
into country income differences discovered in this paper, and examine why later
joining OECD countries appear to have a different mechanism than veteran OECD
countries. Finally, further research should examine whether those differences appear
in developing nations as well.
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All Countries Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Average Growth (Compounded)j,k 621 0.007 0.074 -0.332 0.425
Fraction of value addedj,k 755 0.034 0.040 0.000009 0.328
Bank developmentk 792 0.892 0.444 0.272 2.463
Bank concentrationk 792 0.487 0.125 0.248 0.761
Monetary Policyk 792 13.43 26.37 0 136.5
Log of per capita GDPk 792 2.471 0.855 0.812 3.607
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 693 0.434 0.348 0.022 1.374
Number of Countries 24
Pre-Data Set OECD Countries Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Average Growth (Compounded)j,k 476 0.004 0.072 -0.332 0.425
Fraction of value addedj,k 567 0.034 0.040 0.000009 0.328
Bank developmentk 594 0.979 0.468 0.272 2.463
Bank concentrationk 594 0.477 0.126 0.248 0.761
Monetary Policyk 594 14.31 30.01 2.2 136.5
Log of per capita GDPk 594 2.864 0.540 1.112 3.607
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 561 0.366 0.269 0.114 1.374
Number of Countries 18
Late Joining OECD Countries Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Average Growth (Compounded)j,k 145 0.014 0.081 -0.176 0.325
Fraction of value addedj,k 188 0.034 0.038 0.00003 0.201
Bank developmentk 198 0.629 0.200 0.405 0.970
Bank concentrationk 198 0.517 0.117 0.307 0.647
Monetary Policyk 198 10.82 8.471 0 23.32
Log of per capita GDPk 198 1.291 0.434 0.812 2.104
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 132 0.233 0.211 0.022 0.499
Number of Countries 6
TABLE 8. Data Statistics for Averaged Data 1993-2005
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All Countries Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Growth of value addedj,k,t 7046 -0.001 0.342 -5.598 4.802
Fraction of value addedj,k,t 7699 0.035 0.043 0.00006 1
Bank developmentk,t 10404 0.779 0.599 0.0005 3.135
Bank concentrationk,t 10506 0.497 0.149 0.191 0.919
Monetary Policyk,t 9690 8.897 14.980 0.01 136.47
Log of per capita GDPk,t 10608 3.598 1.975 0.192 10.838
Stock market capitalization/GDPk,t 10608 0.408 0.387 0 1.990
Number of Countries 24
Pre-Data Set OECD Countries Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Growth of value addedj,k 5253 -0.008 0.324 -5.598 4.802
Fraction of value addedj,k 5755 0.035 0.044 0.00006 1
Bank developmentk 7752 0.856 0.669 0.0005 3.135
Bank concentrationk 7854 0.487 0.150 0.191 0.919
Monetary Policyk,t 7718 8.017 15.909 0 136.47
Log of per capita GDPk 7956 4.168 1.972 0.192 10.838
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 7956 0.469 0.417 0 1.990
Number of Countries 18
Late Joining OECD Countries Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Growth of value addedj,k 1793 0.020 0.390 -3.900 3.322
Fraction of value addedj,k 1944 0.036 0.041 0.008 0.252
Bank developmentk 2652 0.553 0.178 0.292 0.976
Bank concentrationk 2652 0.527 0.144 0.225 0.858
Monetary Policyk,t 1972 12.338 9.866 2.08 60.92
Log of per capita GDPk 2652 1.908 0.365 1.289 2.743
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 2652 0.223 0.178 0 0.907
Number of Countries 6
TABLE 9. Data Statistics for Annual Data 1993-2005
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Fraction Bank CR3 MP MP ∗ CR3 GDP Stock
Fraction of value addedj,k 1.000
Bank developmentk -0.022 1.000
Bank concentrationk 0.033 -0.358* 1.000
Monetary policyk 0.007 -0.353* 0.056 1.000
Monetary policyk ∗ Bankconcentrationk 0.009 -0.351* 0.108 0.998* 1.000
Log of GDP per capitak -0.018 0.505* -0.358* -0.410* -0.413 1.000
Stock market capitalization/ GDPk -0.038 0.337* -0.437* -0.103* -0.122* 0.442* 1.000
Fraction Bank CR3 MP MP ∗ CR3 GDP Stock
Fraction of value addedj,k,t 1.000
Bank developmentk,t 0.025 1.000
Bank concentrationk,t 0.049* -0.135* 1.000
Monetarypolicy,tk -0.001 -0.170* 0.126* 1.000
Monetay policyk,t ∗ Bank concentrationk,t 0.005 -0.172* 0.225* 0.974* 1.000
Log of GDP per capitak,t -0.011 -0.343* -0.032* -0.275* -0.207* 1.000
Stock market capitalization/ GDPk 0.056* 0.576* -0.037* -0.142* -0.150* -0.181* 1.000
*indicates that the correlation is different than zero at the 1% level
*indicates that the correlation is different than zero at the 1% level
TABLE 11. Correlation Table for Annual Data 1993-2005
TABLE 10. Correlation Table for Averaged Data 1993-2005
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CG2001 Table IV New Data Table IV New Data Table IV
Dependent Variable Compounded Growth of Value-Added
1980-1990 1980-1990 1993-2005
Bank concentrationk -0.048*** -0.125*** -0.047**
(0.017) (0.032) (0.022)
Fraction of value addedj,k -0.876*** 0.131 0.001
(0.260) (0.135) (0.097)
Bank developmentk 0.066*** -0.012*** -0.030***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.007)
Log of per capita GDPk -0.016*** -0.023** 0.017*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.010)
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 0.031*** -0.020 0.021*
(0.006) (0.015) (0.011)
R2 0.137 0.189 0.188
Observations 1150 446 476
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
TABLE 12. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) Replication Tables
(Industry Fixed-Effects Included)
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Early OECD Only All Data All Data With Dummies
Dependent Variable Compounded Growth of Value-Added
1993-2005 1993-2005 1993-2005
Dummy for Late Joining OECD Countries -0.164***
(0.022)
Bank concentrationk -0.047** 0.031 -0.046**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
OECD Dummy ∗Bank Concentration 0.397***
(0.053)
Fraction of value addedj,k 0.011 0.047 0.037
(0.097) (0.091) (0.086)
Bank developmentk -0.030*** 0.004 -0.027***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log of per capita GDPk 0.017* -0.008 0.017*
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 0.022* 0.004 0.019*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Dummy For Greece 0.145*** 0.109*** 0.142***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
R2 0.248 0.194 0.254
Observations 476 621 621
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
TABLE 13. Adding Interactions for Late OECD Countries
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Compounded Growth of Value-Added
Dataset CG2001 CG2001 1993-2005 1993-2005
Bank concentrationk -0.033*** 0.042** -0.047** 0.179
(0.011) (0.018) (0.023) (0.130)
Monetary policyk,1994 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.00002 0.020*
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.011)
Monetary policyk,1994 ∗Bank concentrationk - -0.007*** - -0.038*
(0.001) (0.021)
Fraction of value addedj,k -0.305*** -0.382*** 0.011 0.010
(0.110) (0.108) (0.097) (0.095)
Bank developmentk 0.078*** 0.097*** -0.030*** -0.017
(0.017) (0.019) (0.007) (0.011)
Log of per capita GDPk -0.022*** -0.027*** 0.018 0.029*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015)
Stock market capitalization/GDPk 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.021* 0.027**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Dummy For Greece - - 0.146*** 0.191***
(0.026) (0.038)
Constant 0.219*** 0.227*** -0.021 -0.015
(0.059) (0.057) (0.032) (0.048)
R2 0.338 0.360 0.248 0.254
Observations 621 621 476 476
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
TABLE 14. Estimation of Equation (4.1)
(Industry Fixed Effects Included)
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TABLE 15. Estimation of Equation (4.2)
(Obs=5448, Industry Fixed Effects and Country Fixed Effects Included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Growth of Real Value Addedj,k,t
Growthj,k,t−1 -0.349*** -0.279*** -0.302*** -0.317***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Bank concentrationk,t -0.249*** -0.213*** -0.170*** -0.173**
(0.068) (0.065) (0.064) (0.077)
Monetary policyk,t -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
MPk,t ∗ CR3k,t 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fraction of value addedj,k,t 6.138*** 1.151*** 1.165*** 1.148***
(0.771) (0.151) (0.154) (0.151)
Bank developmentk,t 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.050 0.013
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032)
Log of per capita GDPk,t 0.011* 0.012** -0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Capitalization/GDPk,t -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.122*** 0.031
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
TimeTrend - - 0.008*** -
(0.002)
Constant -0.070 0.504*** 0.0376*** 0.431***
(0.137) (0.100) (0.105) (0.107)
R2 0.219 0.127 0.129 0.170
Industry-by-Country Fixed Effects? Yes No No No
Time Fixed Effects? No No No Yes
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 16. Estimation of Equation (4.2) With Different Measures of Bank
Concentration
(Obs=5448, Industry and Country Fixed Effects Included)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Growth of Real Value Addedj,k,t
Concentration Measure CR3 CR5 HHI
Growthj,k,t−1 -0.279*** -0.297*** -0.295***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Bank concentrationk,t -0.213*** -0.226*** -0.023
(0.065) (0.066) (0.053)
Monetary policyk,t -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
MPk,t ∗Bank concentrationk,t 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.011**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Fraction of value addedj,k,t 1.151*** 1.148*** 1.140***
(0.155) (0.154) (0.154)
Bank developmentk,t 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.078**
(0.029) (0.029) ( 0.028)
Log of per capita GDPk,t 0.012** 0.011* 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Capitalization/GDPk,t -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.114***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant 0.504*** 0.551*** 0.397***
(0.100) (0.108) (0.097)
R2 0.127 0.127 0.125
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 17. Estimation of Equation (4.2) With Different Measures of Monetary Policy
(Industry and Country Fixed Effects Included)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Growth of Real Value Addedj,k,t
Policy Measure T-Bill Rate T-Bond Rate Lending Rate Money Rate Minus Inflation
Growthj,k,t−1 -0.284*** -0.278*** -0.288*** -0.294***
(0.049) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036)
Bank concentrationk,t -0.145** -0.412*** -0.384*** -0.132**
(0.058) (0.084) (0.090) (0.061)
Monetary policyk,t -0.001 -0.012** -0.023*** -0.006***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
MPk,t ∗Bank concentrationk,t -0.006 0.040*** 0.018** 0.001
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.001)
Fraction of value addedj,k,t 1.333*** 1.198*** 1.237*** 1.151***
(0.227) (0.153) (0.169) (0.156)
Bank developmentk,t -0.015 0.103*** 0.045 0.087***
(0.024) (0.027) ( 0.030) (0.029)
Log of per capita GDPk,t -0.05 0.028*** 0.001 0.015**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Capitalization/GDPk,t -0.128*** -0.083*** -0.107*** -0.118***
(0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 0.153 -0.216*** 0.208** -0.350***
(0.111) (0.067) (0.087) (0.090)
R2 0.132 0.108 0.122 0.122
Observations 3547 6058 5127 5401
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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TABLE 18. Estimation of Equation (4.2) With Differing Lag Structures
(Industry and Country Fixed Effects Included)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Growth of Real Value Addedj,k,t
Growthj,k,t−1 -0.295*** -0.296*** -0.335***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
Growthj,k,t−2 - - -0.133**
(0.043)
Bank concentrationk,t -0.315*** -0.211*** -0.264***
(0.061) (0.058) (0.062)
Bank concentrationk,t−1 0.186** 0.223*** 0.212***
(0.084) (0.055) (0.059)
Bank concentrationk,t−2 - 0.216*** 0.312***
(0.073) (0.074)
Monetary policyk,t -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Monetary policyk,t−1 -0.0004 -0.005 -0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Monetary policyk,t−2 - 0.005*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003)
MPk,t ∗ CR3k,t 0.007** 0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
MPk,t−1 ∗ CR3k,t−1 -0.0006 0.007 0.013**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
MPk,t−2 ∗ CR3k,t−2 - -0.010*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004)
Fraction of value addedj,k,t 1.60*** 1.061*** 1.146***
(0.158) (0.162) (0.164)
Bank developmentk,t 0.095*** 0.007 0.056*
(0.037) (0.029) ( 0.031)
Log of per capita GDPk,t 0.013 -0.015** -0.015**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Capitalization/GDPk,t -0.108*** -0.163*** -0.151***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Constant 0.509*** -0.112 0.982***
(0.124) (0.091) (0.196)
R2 0.126 0.147 0.166
Observations 5349 4981 4582
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation details one method in which the financial system helps or
hinders an economy. By making the assumption that banks maximize profits in
competition, these banks now play a large role in the market in which they operate.
Specifically, this dissertation outlines how bank competition impedes or enhances
the transmission of monetary policy. The overall findings are two-fold. First, a
lack of competitors hinders an economy in terms of growth. Second, this higher
concentration also dampens the effectiveness of monetary policy on an economy.
Chapter II first builds a model of a profit maximizing bank, aggregates to
the market level, and shows that bank concentration dampens monetary policy
effectiveness on market lending. Since monopoly banks have steeper marginal revenue
curves than the market demand curve, monetary policy changes affect market lending
less in monopoly markets than in perfectly competitive markets. The theory is then
tested empirically using lending data over U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
The data support the theory and find that monetary policy is indeed dampened on
lending levels by the presence of bank concentration.
The next chapter, chapter III, incorporates the banking set-up from the
previous chapter into an endogenous growth model. The model developed in this
94
chapter has several advantages beyond those in chapter II. First, agents and
the economy are no longer static. The sectors of the economy now interact and
give feedback between each other. Second, the model specifies how bank lending
can be intermediated into an economic variable; capital investment. Last, the
model shows one channel in which monetary policy transmits to capital investment.
Overall, higher inflation increases the nominal return on capital and, therefore capital
investment. But the increase in lending is less in concentrated markets than in non-
concentrated markets. The model also has an additional finding that too high of
inflation may in fact decrease growth. Overall, the findings show that concentration
hinders growth by itself, and that concentration also dampens inflationary effects on
growth as well.
Finally, chapter IV empirically tests the theory provided in chapter III that
concentration adversely affects growth and dampens the effectiveness of monetary
policy on growth. Using country-level data on the growth of real value-added in
manufacturing sectors, the data support the theory that higher bank concentration
does inversely affect growth by itself, and that monetary policy is less effective
adjusting the growth of value-added in countries with higher concentration. The
results are quite robust across various measures of concentration, monetary policy,
and varying lag structures.
The ideas outlined in this dissertation also have several extensions for future
research. First, defining the market both theoretically and empirically is important.
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A banking market in the U.S. is defined on political boundaries based on counties
and MSAs. The way banks actually compete may be based on more geographical
or industrial boundaries. Banks may offer a product to a certain industry, such as
the industry for solar energy. Banks that offer funding to this industry may compete
over county borders or state borders because the firms in solar energy compete across
these boundaries as well. The market may be better defined by the data.
A second extension is to look at other theoretical forms of competition. This
dissertation focuses on one specific type of competition; Nash in quantity Cournot
competition. Other forms such as pricing competition may offer several insights
into how banks compete beyond lending volume. These insights could offer a
different or more intuitive view of how monetary policy flows through banks and
how competition alters that transmission. On this extension, benefit relationships
should also be introduced. This dissertation relies solely on period-by-period profit
maximization, while benefit relationships focuses on profit maximization through
long-term relationships. Lack of competition impedes growth on a period-by-period
analysis, but this effect might be somewhat mitigated when accounting for benefit
relationships.
Another possible extension is to use the framework provided in this dissertation
to analyze how developing nations respond to bank concentration. The country level
empirical analysis from chapter IV only examines how concentration affects monetary
policy and growth in OECD nations. The findings in that chapter have nothing to
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say about developing nations. Since developing nations are a major source of concern
in the growth literature, how banks interact with the economies in these nations is
a fundamental concern as well. Bank concentration may not impede the growth of
these nations, but may in fact support growth. Larger banks in developing nations
could have better ways of screening borrowers for example. Larger banks would
then have lower default rates and these economies would grow faster compared to an
identical nation with many small banks.
Hopefully, these extensions can lead to more of an understanding of exactly
how the financial system affects an economy and to a more thorough understanding
to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER II
A.1. Calculations for Chapter II
Let
∑
j xjL ≡ XL, or total market quantity of loans. Equation (8) shows
h(XL, β, σiL)− ER = −xiLh′1(XL, β, σiL)
Multiplying the right hand side by XL
XL
, then
h(XL, β, σiL)− ER = −xiL
XL
XLh
′
1(XL, β, σiL)
where xiL
XL
= si or market share for bank i. Multiplying both sides by market share,
si, then
si[h(XL, β, σiL)− ER] = −s2iXLh′1(XL, β, σiL)
Aggregating for all i banks in the market then shows that
h(XL, β, σ¯L)− ER = −HHIh′1(XL, β, σ¯L)
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where σ¯L is the weighted average loan default probability for the market and the
left hand side represents the market weighted average markup of loan interest rates
over the federal funds rate. Relabeling h(XL, β, σ¯L) = h(XL) and h
′
1(XL, β, σ¯L) =
h′(XL),and taking a total derivative, then:
h′(XL)dXL − dER = −h′(XL)XLdHHI −HHI[h′(XL) + h′′(XL)XL]dXL
Assuming dHHI = 0 and rearranging this to put all the terms with dXL on the
left-hand side is
{h′(XL) +HHI[h′(XL) + h′′(XL)XL]} dXL = dER
then solving for dXL
dER
shows
dXL
dER
=
1
h′(XL) +HHI[h′(XL) + h′′(XL)XL]
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(1) (2)
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1 - -0.328***
- (-56.5)
∆FFRt -0.057*** -0.0715***
(-18.13) (-24.9)
∆ ln(HHI)t 0.026 0.0300
(0.99) (1.26)
∆FFRt ∗ ∆ ln(HHI)t 0.114*** 0.0917***
(6.22) (5.56)
∆ ln(Population)t 1.613*** 1.681***
(4.91) (5.37)
Inflationt -1.053 -1.919***
(-1.54) (-3.03)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s) 0.421*** 0.403***
(4.40) (4.66)
∆ ln(Assets)t 0.004 -
(0.99) -
Constant 0.107*** 0.152***
(7.20) (10.90)
Observations 26437 24029
Number of Markets 2412 2409
Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
A.2. Additional Robustness Tables for Chapter II
TABLE 19. Regression Results Excluding Lagged Loans and Assets
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TABLE 20. Results Using Real Loan Value (Loans/PCE)
(n=24029, No. of Markets is 2409)
Fixed-Effects Random Effects
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1 -0.326*** -0.296***
(-56.34) (-53.05)
∆FFRt -0.080*** -0.078***
(-34.95) (-34.72)
∆ ln(HHI)t 0.042* 0.037
(1.72) (1.62)
∆FFRt ∗∆ ln(HHI)t 0.096*** 0.101***
(5.81) (6.62)
∆ ln(Population)t 1.907*** 0.974***
(6.16) (4.83)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s) 0.394*** 0.253***
(4.56) (3.61)
∆ ln(Assets)t 0.014*** 0.009**
(3.20) (2.15)
Constant 0.080*** 0.081***
(23.96) (25.34)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1
-0.298*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.295*** -0.295***
(-53.3) (-50.2) (-53.2) (-53.2) (-52.7) (-52.5) (-52.5)
∆FFRt
-0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070***
(-24.8) (-24.5) (-24.6) (-24.5) (-25.0) (-24.8) (-24.8)
∆FFRt−1
- - - - 0.006** 0.005** 0.006**
- - - - (2.45) (2.20) (2.23)
∆ ln(HHI)t
0.037 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.041* 0.029 0.023
(1.61) (1.29) (1.54) (1.54) (1.79) (1.22) (0.97)
∆ ln(HHI)t−1
- - - - - -0.052** -0.052**
- - - - - (2.11) (2.10)
∆FFRt ∗ ∆ ln(HHI)t 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.092*** 0.084*** 0.084***(6.34) (6.44) (6.42) (6.43) (5.96) (5.26) (5.28)
∆FFRt−1 ∗ ∆ ln(HHI)t−1 - - - - - -0.021 -0.020- - - - - (1.37) (1.31)
∆ ln(Population)t
0.920*** 0.917*** 0.905*** 0.913*** 0.844*** 0.867*** 0.880***
(4.55) (4.52) (4.46) (4.49) (4.16) (4.27) (4.33)
Inflationt
-1.89*** -2.15*** -2.10*** -2.07*** -2.39*** -2.59*** -2.64***
(-3.06) (-3.47) (-3.39) (-3.34) (-3.72) (-4.00) (-4.09)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s)
- 0.266*** 0.268*** 0.277*** 0.259*** 0.236*** 0.235***
- (3.80) (3.82) (3.86) (3.69) (3.33) (3.32)
∆Number of Loanst−1 (100,000s)
- - - -0.045 - - -
- - - (-0.62) - - -
∆ ln(Assets)t
0.007* - 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* -
(1.84) - (1.69) (1.69) (1.88) (1.75) -
∆ ln(Assets)t−1
- -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** - -0.012*** -0.012***
- (-2.52) (-2.40) (-2.41) - (-2.99) (-3.11)
Constant
0.150*** 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.166*** 0.169***
(11.0) (11.6) (11.3) (11.3) (11.3) (11.5) (11.8)
Observations 24029 24016 24016 24016 24029 24015 24015
Number of Entities 2409 2409 2409 2409 2409 2409 2409
t statistics in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
TABLE 21. Robustness Checks 1: Time Lags of Variables
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TABLE 22. Robustness Checks 2: Difference in HHI, not % Change
Dependent Variable ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t ∆ ln(Loans)t
∆ ln(Loans)t−1
-0.298*** -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.296*** -0.295*** -0.295***
(-53.3) (-53.3) (-53.3) (-53.3) (-52.7) (-52.5) (-52.5)
∆FFRt
-0.070*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.070***
(-25.2) (-24.8) (-24.9) (-24.9) (-25.3) (-24.1) (-25.1)
∆FFRt−1
- - - - 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
- - - - (2.53) (2.36) (2.38)
∆(HHI)t(1, 000s)
0.041 0.023 0.040 0.040 0.052 0.019 0.002
(0.69) (0.39) (0.67) (0.66) (0.85) (0.31) (0.04)
∆(HHI)t−1(1, 000s)
- - - - - -0.016** -0.016**
- - - - - (2.54) (2.55)
∆FFRt ∗∆(HHI)t(1, 000s) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.25*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.021***(6.11) (6.21) (6.17) (6.18) (5.77) (5.00) (5.03)
∆FFRt−1 ∗∆(HHI)t−1(1, 000s) - - - - - -0.004 -0.004- - - - - (0.94) (0.88)
∆ ln(Population)t
0.894*** 0.890*** 0.879*** 0.887*** 0.820*** 0.852*** 0.863***
(4.42) (4.39) (4.33) (4.36) (4.05) (4.20) (4.26)
Inflationt
-1.91*** -2.16*** -2.12*** -2.09*** -2.42*** -2.61*** -2.66***
(-3.10) (-3.50) (-3.42) (-3.38) (-3.77) (-4.04) (-4.26)
∆Number of Loanst (100,000s)
- 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.274*** 0.256*** 0.251*** 0.250***
- (3.75) (3.77) (3.82) (3.65) (3.57) (3.56)
∆Number of Loanst−1 (100,000s)
- - - -0.046 - - -
- - - (-0.63) - - -
∆ ln(Assets)t
0.007* - 0.006 0.006 0.007* 0.006 -
(1.71) - (1.56) (1.56) (1.74) (1.58) -
∆ ln(Assets)t−1
- -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** - -0.012*** -0.013***
- (-2.51) (-2.40) (-2.41) - (-3.10) (-3.21)
Constant
0.150*** 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.166*** 0.169***
(11.0) (11.5) (11.3) (11.2) (11.3) (11.6) (11.8)
Observations 24030 24017 24017 24017 24030 24017 24017
Number of Entities 2409 2409 2409 2409 2409 2409 2409
t statistics in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATIONS OF EQUATIONS FOR CHAPTER III
B.1. The Savings/Deposit Function
In nominal terms, the budget constraints are:
ptct = Wt −Mt −Dt
pt+1ct+1 = id,t+1Dt +Mt + Tt
Using lower case lettering to denote real holdings and dividing each side by prices
gives:
ct = wt −mt − dt
ct+1 =
id,t+1Dt +Mt + Tt
pt+1
Finally, multiplying the right hand side of the second equation by pt/pt and using
pt/pt+1 = Π
−1
t+1 or the inverse of the inflation factor, gives
ct+1 =
id,t+1dt +mt + τt
Πt+1
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which are the two constraints found in problem (3.1).
Substituting the constraints into equation 3.1, then the problem becomes:
max
mt,dt
U(mt, dt) = ln (wt −mt − dt) + ln(mt) + β ln
(
mt + id,t+1dt + τt
Πt+1
)
Solving yields the following two FOC:
∂U
∂mt
:
1
ct
= β
1
ct+1Πt+1
+
1
mt
∂U
∂dt
:
1
ct
= β
id,t+1
ct+1Πt+1
Substituting the second FOC into the first using ct, then
ct+1 = β
id,t+1
Πt+1
ct = β
id,t+1 − 1
Πt+1
mt
Creating a lifetime budget constraint from the two budget constraints yields
wt − ct −mt = dt = Πt+1ct+1 −mt − τt
id,t+1
Plugging the FOC’s into the lifetime budget constraint to substitute out ct and
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ct+1 for mt and rearranging give the money demand equation
mt =
id,t+1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)
[
wt +
τt
id,t+1
]
Using the right-hand side of the lifetime budget constraint for dt and using the
FOCs to substitute out ct+1 for mt gives
dt =
[
β
(
id,t+1 − 1
id,t+1
)
− 1
id,t+1
]
mt − τt
id,t+1
Lastly, using the money demand equation into the one above gives:
dt =
β(id,t+1 − 1)− 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)wt +
[
β(id,t+1)− 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1) − 1
]
τt
id,t+1
or the demand equation (3.3)
dt =
β(id,t+1 − 1)− 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)wt −
2id,t+1 − 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)
τt
id,t+1
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B.2. Deposit Interest Rate and Bank Profits
Taking (3.5) into (3.9), we can solve for id:
id,t+1 = il,t+1 + i
′
l,t+1DtH
Using (3.5), then:
iL,t+1 = Πt+1αBA
1−α
t+1 k
α−1
t+1
i′L,t+1 = −Πt+1α(1− α)BA1−αt+1 kα−2t+1
Finally, Using the fact that At = kt, and Dt/pt = dt = Πt+1kt+1, then
id,t+1 = Πt+1(αB − Πt+1αB(1− α)H)
and nominal bank profits are equal to the interest earned on loans minus the interest
paid on deposits times total deposits, or
Tt+1 = (iL − id)Dt = Πt+1α(1− α)BHDt = pt+1α(1− α)BHdt
Since real bank profits are nominal profits divided by the price level, then:
τt+1 = α(1− α)BHdt = Πt+1α(1− α)BHkt+1
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B.3. The Capital Accumulation Equation and Growth Equation
Taking the fact that dt = Πt+1kt+1 and using the deposit function (3.3), and
(3.6), then
Πt+1kt+1 =
β(id,t+1 − 1)− 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)(1− α)Bkt −
2id,t+1 − 1
(2 + β)(id,t+1 − 1)
Πtα(1− α)BHkt
id,t+1
taking the growth factor Γ = kt+1/kt;
Γ =
(1− α)B
Πet+1(2 + β)(i
e
d,t+1 − 1)
[
β(ied,t+1 − 1)− 1−
Πt(2i
e
d,t+1 − 1)
ied,t+1
]
where ied,t+1 = Π
e
t+1(αB − Πet+1α(1− α)BH).
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER IV
C.1. Data Conversion
Since the data are only in 4-digit format from the UN, the conversion from
Revision 3 back to Revision 2 is imperfect because one revision 3 code may feed into
several revision 2 codes. An example of this is rev.3 code 1549, the manufacturing of
other food products. This code feeds into both rev.2 3111, slaughtering, preparing
and preserving meat and also into rev.2 3113, canning and preserving of fruits and
vegetables. To overcome this problem, I did an initial conversion where one rev.3 code
converted directly into one rev.2 code. Then is reverted rev.3 codes that went into
several rev.2 codes into the largest share of value-added rev.2 code. For example, if
3111 had a larger share of manufacturing than 3113, I converted rev.3 code 1549 into
rev.2 code 3111. While there is some possible bias in the data because of imperfect
reversions, most of the time overlaps had very small shares of value-added. Typically,
using the example above, rev.2 3111 would already have over 4-5 times more in value-
added than in 3113, so one would expect that the part of rev.3 1549 that streamed
into rev.2 3113 would be much smaller than what went into rev.2 3111. Also, many
times rev.2 code 3110 (3 digit) would be used in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and all
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of rev.3 1549 would feed directly into rev.2 3110. To check against possible biases, I
also have the raw value-added data in rev.3 coding in which to run the regressions. I
also have the one-to-one conversion coding that I used in .xls format that is available.
C.2. Equations used to Calculated Growth Rate Changes
g∗y =
α4
1− α1CR3 +
α5
1− α1MP +
α6
1− α1CR3 ∗MP (C.1)
∂g∗y =
α4
1− α1∂CR3 +
α5
1− α1∂MP +
α6
1− α1
[
CR3 ∗ ∂MP + ∂CR3 ∗MP ] (C.2)
CR3 = 0.497 and MP = 8.897. α1 = −0.279α4 = −0.213α5 = −0.011α6 =
0.007
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